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In Accordance with a Constitutional
Plan: Procedural Due Process and
Zoning Decisions
By

JAMES

R.

KAHN*

Introduction
As the discretionary power of administrative agencies has increased, courts have imposed procedural safeguards to insure fair and
rational decisionmaking by these new centers of political authority.'
Municipal land use planning and zoning agencies have shared in this

administrative growth; in recent years their power and discretion have
mushroomed.2 Yet zoning procedures often remain abysmally inadequate. One authority on the subject has stated:
Given [the] inherent character of the zoning process, it is a sardonic fact that the unbroken thread of criticism of zoning law,
from the early days, to date, has been its unfair process and its
tendency to grant special favors or to refuse to correct patent inequities, without due deliberation. The literature of zoning carries the constant refrain that the process involved in the grant or
denial of change by whatever local body- city council, plan
commission or board of zoning appeals-has been devoid of elementary standards of fairness and forethought.3
* J.D., 1978, Harvard University; B.A., 1974, University of Pennsylvania. Associate,
Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCauley, Philadelphia, Pa.
1. See Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1669, 1717-22 (1975); Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227, 1240-41
(1966).
2. Zoning authorities have gained the constitutional and statutory authority to exercise
increasingly restrictive and comprehensive control over the use of land. Rather than negative, defensive measures, they may now enact positive, assertive restrictions grounded in
detailed planning. Tighter controls have also created a greater need for administrative relief
mechanisms, such as variances, which are within the further discretion of zoning authorities.
See R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 90-93 (1966); Mandelker, The Basic Philosophy of
Zoning- Incentive or Restraint?in THE NEW ZONING: LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND ECONOMIC CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES 14 (N. Marcus & M. Groves ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited
as PhilosophyofZoning]; Mandelker, The Role ofthe Local ComprehensivePlan in Land Use
Regulation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 899 (1976) [hereinafter cited as The Role ofthe Comprehensive
Plan]; Comment, Land Use and Due Process-An Examination ofCurrentFederaland State
Procedures, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 846 (1978).
3. R. Babcock, lead counsel, Brief for Amici Curiae: National Association of Home
[1011]
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There has been extensive effort to create fair procedures through

statutory requirements.4 State courts have often liberally interpreted
such statutes or used common law concepts such as "fundamental fair-

ness" to impose procedural formalities.'

Judges, however, have been

reluctant-and seldom asked-to rely on the due process clauses of the

Federal Constitution 6 as authority for demanding fair procedure from
zoning agencies. A relatively small number of state court decisions
have explicitly relied on the Constitution to require certain procedures
in zoning cases, though hundreds of cases are grounded on substantive
due process 7 or the taking clause.8 No reported federal court decision
has struck down a state zoning authority's decision for failure to adhere
to procedural due process requirements.9
Builders, American Society of Planning Officials, and American Institute of Planners at 15,
City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976) [hereinafter cited as R.
Babcock, Brief in Eastlake]. Accord, 1 R. ANDERSON AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 4.02
(2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as R. ANDERSON]; R. Babcock, supra note 2, at 135;
Mandelker, Philosophy of Zoning, supra note 2, at 18; Dukeminier & Stapleton, The Zoning
BoardofAdjustment: A Case Study in Misrule, 50 Ky. L.J. 273, 274 (19(2) [hereinafter cited
as Dukeminier & Stapleton].
4. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, STANDARDS BUREAU, BUILDING AND
HOUSING DIVISION, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT

BH5 §§ 4-7 (rev. ed. 1926) [hereinafter cited as STANDARD ZONING ENABLING ACT].
5. E.g., Glaspey & Sons, Inc. v. Conrad, 83 Wash. 2d 707, 521 P.2d 1173 (1974). Common law holdings, unlike constitutional rulings, may be modified by statute. See Calaway
v. Town of Litchfield, 112 N.H. 263, 296 A.2d 124 (1972), where the state legislature retroactively legalized local actions that failed to satisfy statutory requirements for notice to citizens. However, the court held the zoning act subjudice void because the state constitution
also required notice.
6. U.S. CONsT. amends V and XIV. The Fifth Amendment provides, in part, that
"[n]o person shall. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
The Fourteenth Amendment makes this limitation applicable to the states.
7. "The concept the Court employs to control the substance of legislation under the
due process clause is that certain types of lawmaking go beyond any proper sphere of government activity. In short, the Court views the act as incompatible with our democratic
system of government and individual liberty. The judicial premise for this position is that
any life, liberty or property limited by such a law is taken without due process because the
Constitution never granted the government the ability to pass such a law." J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J.N. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 382 (1978).
8. "[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9. However, in Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709
(D.N.J. 1976), a motion to dismiss a count alleging denial of procedural due process was
denied. The case was later settled. In Adler v. Lynch, 415 F. Supp. 705 (D. Neb. 1976), the
court found that a landowner was denied due process when the county board failed to adequately notify her of a variance hearing concerning her land. However, the action was
solely for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the court absolved the county officials of
any liability because they acted in good faith. In Harnett v. Board of Zoning, 350 F. Supp.
1159 (D.V.I. 1972), a Virgin Islands zoning board's decision was overturned on due process
grounds due to the board's failure to articulate decisionmaking standards. Also, in Hot
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Yet, diminished reliance on the discretion of administrators, coupled with a greater appreciation of the humanistic values served by
hearing procedures, has sparked a due process "explosion" which has
radically altered the nature of administrative decision making in many
areas. 0 The same factors are present in the land use area, and conditions are thus ripe for change. This article will examine how the due
process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment and similar provisions in state constitutions' can be applied to land use decisions of all
types, from the granting of permits and variances to the development of
comprehensive plans. 2 First, the nature and extent of constitutionally
protected interests in land will be considered, and it will be argued that
the positivist conceptions currently being considered by the Supreme
Court may be avoided. Next, the basic values behind procedural formalities will be noted briefly in order to establish a framework for analyzing what process is due in various situations affecting the use of real
property. It will then be proposed that the legislative-adjudicative distinction be eliminated as a threshold test in local zoning decisions, and
instead be incorporated into the process due balancing test now being
applied by the courts. The constitutional need for specific procedural
protections, including some form of comprehensive planning, will then
be examined. This article will conclude that courts should vigorously
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause in order to insure that state and local authorities do not unfairly impinge on property rights.
Shoppes, Inc. v. Clouser, 231 F. Supp. 825 (D.D.C. 1964), the federal court exercised its
direct jurisdiction over the District of Columbia local authorities and voided a decision
where zoning board members made exparte visits to the site.
10. See Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1268 (1975). See
also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 514-15 (1978); Stewart, supra note 1, at
1717-22.
11. For discussions of the due process clauses in various state constitutions, see generall, Brennan, State Constitutionsand the Protection ofIndividualRights, 90 HARV. L. REV.
489 (1977); Falk, The State Constitution A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61
CALIF. L. REv. 273 (1973); Howard, State Courts and ConstitutionalRights in the Day ofthe
Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976); Project, Toward an Activist Rolefor State Bills of
Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271 (1973); Note, The New Federalism: TowardaPrincipled Interpretationofthe State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REv. 297 (1977).
12. This article will not deal with any constitutional requirement of judicial review, or
the standards for such review. Neither will procedural requirements for state or regional
planning be discussed. In the federal courts, jurisdiction, abstention, and the existence of a
federal claim for relief are also considerations, though they will not be discussed. See, e.g.,
Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709, 715-20 (D.N.J. 1976); Webber v. Skoko, 432 F. Supp. 810, 811-13 (D. Or. 1977); 1 A. RAirrHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 2.03 (4th ed. 1979).
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Property Interests

A. Traditional Protection for Interests in Land
Until recently the nature of the interests protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not a major focus of constitutional litigation.13 In the era of substantive due process protection
typified by the Supreme Court decision in Lochner v. New York,' 4 the
word "liberty," in particular, was held to refer to a wide range of interests.15 In contrast, the "property" term of the Amendment received little attention,' 6 save for a general consensus that such interests must be
created by some source, usually state law.' 7
When the first of the new wave of procedural due process decisions was handed down in the early 1970's, protected interests were
liberally defined. The Court found in Bell v. Burson,'8 without even
discussing whether liberty or property was involved, that a driver's license was protected by the due process clause. Welfare benefits, along
with other government entitlements, were identified as property in
Goldberg v. Kely.' 9 The latter decision seemed to pave the way for the
extension of due process protection to those entitlements formerly excluded as "privileges." 20
13. "For decades the crucial fourteenth amendment battles have been fought over the
substantive validity of action taken by the states .... [T]here seems to have been an overriding concensus that every individual "interest" worth talking about isencompassed within
the "liberty" and "property" secured by the due process clause and thus entitled to some
constitutional protection. . . .The "right-privilege" distinction, the last barrier to such a
concensus, has completely fallen. That doctrine has been invoked to justify a denial of due
process scrutiny of some types of governmental conduct in the public sector, for example,
since there was no independent "right" to welfare payments, their denial, standing alone,
did not implicate any constitutional value. . . .The "right-privilege" doctrine's lack of solid
theoretical underpining resulted in its erratic enforcement and, ultimately, its demise."
Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Propery," 62 CORNELL L. REv. 405, 406-07 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Monaghan].

See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 506-14

(1978).
14. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
15. See Monaghan, supra note 13, at 411-14; Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the
FourteenthAmendment, 39 HARV. L. REv. 431 (1926).
16. Monaghan, supra note 13, at 435.
17. E.g., Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36. 42-43 (1944).
18. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
19. 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970).
20. "[C]ourts adhered until quite recently to a distinction ... between individual
'rights' stemming from constitutional or common law sources and mere 'privileges' bestowed
by government; the latter could be withheld absolutely and 'therefore' could be withheld
conditionally-even if the condition, viewed independently, would have violated a settled
constitutional norm like that against ideological censorship or racial discrimination." L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 509-10 (1978) (footnote omitted).
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However, the Burger Court, concerned about the growing number
of procedural due process cases brought in federal courts and the re21

sulting intrusion of federal standards into state and local government,

placed limits on the application of procedural due process. In Boardof
Regents v. Roth,2 2 the Court established a two-step procedure for deter-

mining whether the Constitution requires due process safeguards. Initially, the deprivation of a protected interest must be shown; then the
procedures to be afforded are determined by balancing the size of the
protected interest against the administrative costs involved. 23 Since
Roth, the Court has focused on the textual classifications of life, liberty

and property in determining the scope of a protected interest. Roth
reemphasized that, particularly where "new property"24 might be involved, state law must be examined to determine when a claim of entitlement may legitimately be made. 5
Interests in land are fundamental to the system of property classification. At least since the formulation of the common law estates doctrines, 26 land has been the most consistently protected form of property.
27
It has long been constitutionally guarded by the due process clause.

Indeed, the Roth Court initiated its discussion of protected property
interests by noting that "the property interests protected by procedural
28
due process extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate ....
Thus, ownership of land remains protected under the Roth test for entitlements; certainly the law of every state recognizes interests in real

property.
B. Dangers of Positivist Doctrine

Real property, this safest of constitutionally protected havens, may
be vulnerable to the Burger Court's attempt to curtail due process pro-

tection through the positivist approach first proposed in Justice Rehn21. See Monaghan, supra note 13, at 408.
22. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
23. Id at 569-71, 570 nn.7 & 8.
24. See Reich, The New Property,73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
25. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
26. See 1 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1-2 (3d ed. 1939). See also Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Propery in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 691 (1938): "Property
...has varied infinitely in character and content from century to century and from place to
place. Of course, land and its produce have always been with us."
27. See, e.g., Washington exrel Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928);
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171
(1915), all of which are substantive due process decisions. See also Developments in the
Lawn-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1503 (1978) [hereinafter cited as DevelopmentsZoning].
28. 408 U.S. at 571-72.
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quist's plurality opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy. 9 Justice Rehnquist
argued that where a state granted an entitlement subject to certain limited procedures, it can, by following those delineated procedures, deprive a person of that entitlement without impinging on a property
interest." In other words, the substantive interest is created only by
positive law, such as a statute, and is itself limited by the procedural
protections in the law. As Justice Rehnquist wryly commented, the
31
beneficiary "must take the bitter with the sweet.1
Because of the rather inconsistent approaches of several justices, it
is impossible to determine whether Justice Rehnquist's position has
gained the support of a majority on the Court. It likely has not.3 2 For
29. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
30. Id at 152-54.
31. Id at 154. In Arnett, the Rehnquist plurality found that the statute which granted
the plaintiff, a non-probationary civil service employee, an expectancy in his job also specified the procedures for terminating him. Reasoning that the state may condition an entitlement on certain procedures, the plurality held that since the specified statutory procedures
had been followed, the plaintiff was not deprived of a protected interest. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart joined in this opinion. Justices Powell and Blackmun were of the
view that while the plaintiff had a legitimate claim of entitlement to a property interest
under the Fifth Amendment, he had been afforded constitutionally adequate procedures.
Id at 164 (Powell, J., with whom Blackmun, J., joins, concurring in part and concurring the
result in part).
32. The Arnett rationale was apparently followed by Justice Powell in his dissenting
opinion in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975) (joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist). Justice Stevens also employed the reasoning from Arnett in his opinion for the Court in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist). The Goss dissent stated that
the right to a public school education in Ohio was limited by a statute permitting principals
to suspend students for as long as ten days; therefore, the ten-day suspension of a student did
not impinge on a property interest. Bishop held that a policeman's interest in his job was
limited by the removal procedure specified in a city ordinance-simple notice before termination. Termination without a hearing was therefore held not to violate the due process
clause.
The Arnett plurality's argument was explicitly rejected, however, by the other six members of the Court in that case as well as the dissenting justices in Bishop. Additionally,
Justice Stevens, in a dissent to Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 631 (1977), appears to have
distinguished his Bishop opinion from the Arnett plurality's position. Stevens' dissent in
City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 680 (1976), could also be
interpreted as a rejection of Arnett, as is discussed in the text infra.
Thus, Justice Rehnquist's only steadfast adherent appears to be Chief Justice Burger.
While Justice Stewart joined Rehnquist's Arnett opinion, Stewart also joined the majority in
Goss. After initially rejecting the position in Arnett, Justice Powell appears to be leaning
towards Rehnquist's view in Bishop and in his Goss dissent. However, Justices Blackmun
and Stevens appear to have rejected the application of the positivist approach in all cases.
Finally, Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall have clearly rejected the position. Thus, it is
far from true that a majority of the Court has adopted Relmquist's argument. Accord, L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 535 (1978); Monaghan, supra note 13, at 438
n.217. But see Perry, Constitutional '"airness": Notes on Equal Protection and Due Process,
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the purpose of argument, however, it will be assumed to be the law. At
the very least, the following discussion will illustrate the dangers of the
Rehnquist position. As several commentators have indicated, the
Rehnquist argument could logically be applied to any entitlement-no
matter how stable or reliable it is-to which the legislature appends
even limited procedures enabling withdrawal of the entitlement.3 3
More significantly, the logic could also apply to "old property," including real estate.
At the bottom of Arnett's slippery slope lies the following. It is
well established that the state, under the police power, may significantly burden the use of land through zoning restrictions without paying compensation. 34 That is, an owner's right to develop his land is
always subject to applicable zoning restrictions. 35 Therefore, the government's ability to withdraw or fail to grant certain development
rights is similar to its ability to withdraw entitlements such as government jobs or welfare benefits. If, as is generally the case, the government's statutory scheme for regulating the use of land includes certain
minimum procedural safeguards, however limited, a landowner is entitled to no further procedures when the government exercises its legitimate authority.
A variation of this argument might be made in the benign defense
of comprehensive planning, but is just as insidious to the fair administration of zoning. If land is already burdened by a zoning ordinance or
comprehensive plan, it might be argued that a landowner seeking a
more profitable use through a variance or other exception is claiming
something which is purely a gratuitous government entitlement.
Therefore, the most he can constitutionally claim is the protection afforded by the statutorily granted procedures; perhaps he can claim no
due process at all since he has been deprived of nothing. The latter
position gains particular credibility where the owner bought the land
63 VA. L. REv. 383, 425 (1977) (implying the Rehnquist position may have a majority); Van
Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property Adjudicative DueProcessin the Administrative State,
62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 469 n.74 (1977) (indicating the same).
33. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 575 (1978); Monaghan, supra note 13,
at 442-43; Van Alstyne, supra note 32, at 469-79; Note, DemocraticDue Process: Administrative Procedureafter Bishop v. Wood, 1977 DUKE L.J. 453, 459.
34. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
(landmarks law prohibiting development of a plot containing historic structure is not a taking); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (zoning law preventing
the filling of wetlands is not a taking).
35. E.g., City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668-681 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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subject to the restriction, presumably paying a purchase price that reflected the limited opportunities allowed under the existing ordinance.
In a footnote to his opinion for the Court in City of Eastlake v.
Forest City Enterprises,Inc.,36 Chief Justice Burger seemed to adopt
this view. In Eastlake, an amendment to the Eastlake City Charter that
required change in land use be approved by a 55% vote in a referendum had been invalidated by the Ohio Supreme Court37 as a standardless delegation of legislative power violative of the due process clause.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a referendum for all voters
was not a delegation at all, but a permissible reservation of power by
the voters.38
Although the result in Eastlake implies that there was a deprivation of property for which due process could provide protection, Chief
Justice Burger indicated that there was no deprivation at all. In a footnote rebutting the view expressed in two dissenting opinions 39 that the
referendum plan was violative of due process for the additional reason
that there were no provisions for notice and hearing, Burger stated:
The situation presented in this case is not one of a zoning action
denigrating the use or depreciating the value of land; instead it
involves an effort to change a reasonable zoning restriction. No
existing rights are being impaired; new use rights are being
sought from the City Council. Thus, this case involves an owner
seeking approval of a new use free4 0 from the restrictions attached
to the land when it was acquired.
This is a remarkable comment since courts facing due process challenges to zoning decisions inevitably assume that landowners have suffered constitutionally protected deprivations. 41 Perhaps this aside is
not so surprising, however, given the positivist position taken in Arnett
and its progeny.42
In a thoughtful dissent to the Eastlake decision, Justice Stevens
36. Id at 679 n.13.
37. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 324 N.E.2d 740
(1975).
38. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 675 (1976).
39. Id. at 680 (Powell, J., dissenting), (Stevens and Brennan, JJ.. dissenting).
40. Id at 679 n.13 (original emphasis). See also id at 674 n.8.
41. But see W.C. & A.N. Miller Dev. Co. v. D.C. Zoning Comm'n, 340 A.2d 420, 424
(D.C. Ct. of App. 1975) (holding that "a property owner has no right to a particular zoning
classification"). See also 8 GA. L. REV. 254, 262 (1973) which suggests the Burger position.
This is a note on South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 482 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1974), a panel
decision which was subsequently overturned by the court en banc, 491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 837 (1974).
42. See note 32 supra. See also Horn v. County of Ventura, 24 Cal. 3d 605, 615, 596
P.2d 1134, 1139, 156 Cal. Rptr. 718, 723 (1979) (rejecting argument that a plaintiff "must
reasonably have anticipated" a proposed project involving adjacent property).
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addressed the point directly. He first stated: "The fact that an individual owner. . may not have a legal right to relief he seeks does not
mean he has no right to fair procedure in the consideration of the merits of his application."4 3 Thus, Justice Stevens recognized a significant
principle which underlies procedural due process: no matter how contingent a property right may be, the government must distribute it in a
fundamentally fair manner. This principle is ignored by both Justice
Rehnquist in Arnett and Chief Justice Burger in Eastlake. Proper application of the principle means that whenever zoning regulations restrict an owner from realizing the most profitable use of his land, he has
due process rights stemming from that deprivation which guarantee
fair procedures in any attempt to challenge the zoning decision.
Instead of relying solely on the inherent right to develop land, Justice Stevens noted that the procedural mechanisms themselves create
the expectations which invoke due process:
[N]o matter how comprehensive a zoning plan may be, it regularly contains some mechanism for granting, variances, amendments, or exemptions for specific uses of specific pieces of
property .... The expectancy that particular changes consistent
With the basic zoning plan will be allowed frequently and on
their merits is a normal incident of property ownership. . . .The
fact that codes regularly provide a procedure for granting individual exceptions or changes, the fact that such changes are
granted in individual cases with great frequency, and the fact that
the particular code in the record before us contemplates that
changes consistent with the basic plan will be allowed, all support
my opinion that the opportunity to apply for an amendment is an
aspect of property ownership protected by the Due Process
Clause. . ...
45
In those "regular" cases where relief mechanisms are provided for,
Justice Stevens' analysis would result in protection similar to that
where reliance is placed solely on inherent development rights. However, Stevens also seems to imply that in some cases the legislature
could denigrate property rights by limiting accompanying procedures.
43. City of Easflake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 682 (1976) (Stevens,
J., with whom Brennan, J., joins, dissenting).
44. Id at 681-83 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted). See also the definition of a
landowner's due process interest under Roth provided in a recent article: "State law generally defines the entitlement to seek reclassification of zoned land as a part of land ownership." Hogue, Eastlake and Arlington Heights: New Hurdles in Regulating Urban Land
Use?, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REv.41, 57 (1977).
45. Justice Stevens also implied that such mechanisms themselves may be constitutionally required. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 682 (1976)
(Stevens, J., with whom Brennan, J., joins, dissenting).
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This rationale must be rejected.4 6 To use first-year law school

property terms, due process is not triggered by a consideration of the
complete "bundle of sticks" held by the landowner. Rather, it protects
the right to develop, which is one of those sticks, and is itself part of the

bundle.47 This4 distinction is quite important given the nature of the
"new" zoning. " In particular, municipalities which are unwilling to

make choices and formulate a workable comprehensive plan may assign lower-density use than would normally be desirable, relying on a

great number of individual exceptions-and administrative discretion-to allow more intensive use of the land.49 This approach is often

employed, not to prohibit the introduction of harmful or undesirable
externalities, but to encourage developers to confer benefits on the

community.5" In such a situation, it is unwise to rely on the initial zoning decision to determine the extent of a property right for due process

purposes. Exceptions are often the key to land use control and they
should be fairly administered in order to safeguard property interests.
Zoning expert Richard Babcock concurs: "Procedural due process is
continually flaunted in our medieval hearings. . . . I believe it is a

greater social and political evil to have a "good" municipal plan...
but to administer it unfairly than it is to have no plan but fair administration of a zoning ordinance."'I
C. Property Interests of Non-Owners

Those who do not own the land involved in a zoning decisionneighbors, tenants, developers and community groups-might also
claim due process rights in administrative proceedings determining its
use. Before examining these non-owner's rights, three facets of the

property interests of owners52 should be identified. First, an owner has
46. Certain statutory schemes, such as where exceptions are allow ed only in quite specific circumstances which can be routinely determined without a hearing, might create a
situation where only minimal process is due, under the many considerations discussed in the
text infra. Yet a court should still find a deprivation triggering due process considerations.
47. Cf.C. HAAR & L. LIEBMAN, PROPERTY AND LAW 841 (1977) (permission to build is
a major stick in the bundle). See also Developments-Zoning,supra note 27, at 1520-21.
48. See note 2 supra.
49. See The Role ofthe ComprehensivePlan,supra note 2, at 910. D. MANDELKER, THE
ZONING DILEMMA 61 (1971) [hereinafter cited as ZONING DILEMMA].
50. See Mandelker, Philosophy of Zoning, supra note 2, at 14-15; R. BABCOCK, THE
ZONING GAME 90 (1966).
51. R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 135 (1966). Accord D. MANDELKER, ZONING
DILEMMA, supra note 49, at 64.
52. A person under contract to buy land, pending the outcome of zoning proceedings,
should also be considered an owner for due process purposes. The Supreme Court recently
held that a conditional purchase contract for land would create standing for a substantive
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the right to put land to its highest use, what can be called a development right. 3 Second, where an owner's land is already developed, he

must still be concerned with the property's utility value, measured by
his ability to continue the current use.

4

Third is the right to sell land.

Although zoning regulations never prohibit alienation, if a classification decreases a parcel's development or utility value, it will certainly

affect its sale value. In fact, dimunition in resale price is the traditional
measure of loss of development or utility value.
These classifications can also be used to identify the rights of nonowners, because a neighboring landholder's property is similarly affected by a change in zoning and use of the nearby land (the "owner's"
land). The neighbor risks loss of development value if the owner's use

prevents realization of the neighbor's own plans."

Where the neigh-

bor's property is already developed, a rezoning and consequent change

in use of the nearby land may affect his current use and enjoymentthe utility value. Both development and utility values, of course, will
affect resale value.5 6 For instance, rezoning of a property to permit a
due process claim, implying that the contract created a recognized property right as well.
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Devel. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 at 262-63 (1977).
A conditional buyer's due process rights may be less than the true owner's. For instance,
buyers may not be entitled to separate notice, as it would be impossible for a municipality to
identify such parties and they should be able to rely on the current owner transmitting notices from the city. Also, the extent of hearing procedures should not be increased when a
conditional purchaser is involved; he and the true owner should share in the quantum of
procedure afforded.
53. See Cunningham & Kremer, Vested Rights, Estoppel and the Land Development
Process, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 625, 629-33 (1978).
54. A question might arise as to whether utility should be measured by a subjective or
objective standard. If a person is extraordinarily sensitive to noise, is his loss of enjoyment
from a slightly noisy factory protected even if resale value is not diminished? This question
is faced particularly where aesthetic externalities are involved. Even if a subjective standard
is used, it should be noted that under a process-due balancing very little process need be
granted those with ephemeral interests, and that even less substantive consideration of such
claims is required.
55. It should be emphasized that for purposes of determining whether due process protection is triggered, and how much process is due, the loss to the neighbor is that incurred to
his own land; the degree to which the owner's land is affected by rezoning is irrelevant.
Obviously a neighbor will be less affected than the landowner in almost every situation, but
under the Roth two-step analysis, the size of the interest is a factor in determining only what
process is due, not whether it is due. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 675 (1977); Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 566, 570-71 (1972). To determine whether a constitutionally protected deprivation has occurred at all, a court should look only to the nature and not the
weight of the interest. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 575-76 (1975); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 566, 570-71 (1972). Any loss of
property which is not de minimis triggers due process. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
674 (1977); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975).
56. See Comment, The FasanoProcedures: Is Due ProcessEnough?, 6 ENVT'L L. 139,
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factory use might affect a neighbor's utility value because the noise, dirt
and traffic generated by the factory might deprive him of his common
law right to the peaceful use and enjoyment of his property.57 Additionally, he might lose development value if he plans a similar factory
on his land that would be hurt by the nearby competition.5"
The courts have generally found that neighbors have interests protected by the due process clause.59 The California Supreme Court, for
example, has even recognized that a non-resident of a political jurisdiction is entitled to certain due process protections if his property is affected by the rezoning of the neighboring owner's land.60
Persons renting property should also be considered to have protected interests, as they are the prime beneficiaries of the land's utility
value. In most cases, the owner-landlord would have similar interests
and his hearing rights would protect his tenants. But often tenants will
have more incentive to contest a zoning decision or have more information to contribute at a hearing. Additionally, a landlord's and tenant's
concerns might diverge. For instance, particular tenants might oppose
increased development in an area because it would make their building
more desirable to others-without enhancing its utility value to them145-46 (1975). Cf. D. MANDELKER, ZONING DILEMMA, supra note 49. at 81-82 (neighbors'
interest for substantive due process or taking claims); R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 14044 (1966) (neighbors' interests generally).
57. See Horn v. County of Ventura, 24 Cal. 3d 605, 596 P.2d 1149. 156 Cal. Rptr. 718
(1979). But see Feldman v. Star Homes, 199 Md. 1, 84 A.2d 903 (1951) (truck noise and
headlights do not create a constitutionally recognized deprivation).
58. But see Developments-Zoning, supra note 27, at 1522. Even if there is a property
right, a zoning board is unlikely to be impressed by such a claim on substantive grounds.
Note that development value would also be impaired if the neighbor has not yet built a
factory, but plans to do so in the future, or plans to sell the land to someone else who will.
This value would not be recognized if the positivist approach described above were taken.
See text accompanying notes 1294-1315 supra. That approach defines property interests in
terms of what the existing ordinances allow, and it could be argued that the neighbor had no
right to develop beyond what uses are now permitted. A positivist analysis would also bar
assertion of a deprivation based on the neighbor's intent to himself seek a rezoning in order
to allow development.
59. E.g., Masters v. Pruce, 290 Ala. 56, 274 So. 2d 33 (1973); Horn v. County of Ventura, 24 Cal. 3d 605, 596 P.2d 1149, 156 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1979); Bell v. Studdard, 220 Ga. 756,
141 S.E.2d 536 (1965); Morris v. City of Catlettsburg, 437 S.W.2d 753 (Ky. 1969); McCauley
v. Albert E. Briede & Son, 231 La. 36, 90 So.2d 78 (1956); Town of Somerset v. Montgomery
Bd. of Appeals, 245 Md. 52, 225 A.2d 294 (1966); Kuarpenko v. City of Southfield, 75 Mich.
App. 188, 254 N.W.2d 839 (1977); Thomas v. Busch, 7 Mich. App. 245, 151 N.W.2d 391
(1967); Gazan v. Corbett, 278 App. Div. 953, 105 N.Y.S.2d 187 (1951): Vandervort v. Sisters
of Mercy, 90 Ohio App. 153, 117 N.E.2d 51 (1952); Tierney v. Duris, 21 Or. App. 613, 536
P.2d 435 (1975) (plaintiffs simply town residents); Fasano v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 264
Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
60. Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541,492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972).
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thereby allowing the landlord to increase their rent. The landlord
would, or course, favor the area development for this same reason.
Accordingly, a tenant ought to be able to supplement--or challenge-his landlord's presentation at agency hearings. Perhaps separate mailed notice6' should be provided for tenants since owners may
fail to pass their notification on to their tenants. It seems more practical to place the burden of notifying each tenant directly on the municipalities. Tenants also should be able to make procedural objections to
administrative hearings. These due process rights are based on tenants'
property interests in their leases.62 These interests may not be as large
as an owner's, but they are nonetheless worthy of some protection
under the Roth balancing test.
In contrast, parties with no connection to zoned or neighboring
land have no constitutionally protected interest. Community or special
interest groups with a concern for land use, or developers studying a
neighborhood but as yet owning no property in it, have no utility, development or sale interest and therefore no due process rights. This is a
sensible result: it would be impractical for a municipality to notify
such groups of all zoning actions and impossible for the city to identify
which specific actions concerned these parties. It would also be unreasonable to require that any community group or developer claiming an
interest be heard at an administrative proceeding.63 However, these

groups assist owners, tenants or neighbors, who do have a due process
right to be heard when proposed zoning changes may affect their property interests, in preparing their presentations.
II. Process Values
"[C onsideration of what procedures due process may require
under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination
of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of
the private interest that has been affected by governmental action."64
61. See text accompanying notes 138-55, infra.
62. This is a seldom acknowledged constitutional interest. But see, e.g., Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (procedural due process challenge by tenants to state eviction
statute). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 509 (1978) (footnotes omitted): "[T]he Supreme Court has. . . consistently recognized that due process requirements
are implicated whenever the enforcement power of government is employed to deprive an
individual of an interest. . . in the peaceful possession or use of real property .. ": "of
course, lease interests have long been recognized generally as property." 1 H. TIFFANY, THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 109 (3d ed. 1939).
63. A zoning body can request a written statement or testimony from a community
organization or developer if it determines that such information would be helpful.
64. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); Goldberg v.
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The Supreme Court has made clear that the determination of what
process is due under certain circumstances involves an explicit balanc-

ing test.65 Much has been written about the "process values" which are
considered in such a balancing test.6 6 The considerations mentioned by
the Court and by commentators can be placed within three basic categories: accuracy, acceptability, and efficiency. 67 These values, which
are summarized here, provide a framework within which zoning deci-

sions may be evaluated.
Accuracy is simply the goal of eliciting optimal decisions----"good

result efficacy," as one commentator has written. 68 Where factual ques-

tions are involved, the aim is to obtain all relevant information and
analyze it correctly. Questions of policy have two facets. One is the
scientific aspect, where expert information and analysis is required.
The other facet is pure policy, where decision makers seek to ascertain

the wishes of their constituents, tie., they strive for "political accuracy."
With either factual or policy issues, it is crucial that decision makers
not be subject to bias, undue influence, or corruption. 61 Moreover, acKelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
65. E.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 675 (1977); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
66. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 502-06 (1978); Friendly,

Some Kind ofHearings, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975); Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due
Process CalculusforAdministrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factorsin
Search ofa Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Mashaw];
Michelman, Formal and AssociationalAims in ProceduralDue Process, in DUE PROCESS,
NoMos XVIII 126 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Michelman];
Perry, Constitutional"Fairness'"Notes on EqualProtectionandDue Process,63 VA. L. REV.
383 (1977); Pincoffs, Due Process,Fraternity,and a Kantian Injunction, in DUE PROCESS,
NOMOS XVIII, supra, at 172 [hereinafter cited as Pincoffs]; Rabin, Job Security and Due
Process: MonitoringAdministrative Discretion Through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. CHI.
L. REV. 60 (1976); Reich, The Law of the PlannedSociety, 75 YALE L.J. 1227 (1966); Saphire,
Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to ProceduralProtection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111 (1978); Subrin & Dykstra, Notice and the Right to Be HeardThe Significanceof Old Friends,9 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 449 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Subrin & Dykstra]; Summers, EvaluatingandImproving Legal Processes-A Pleafor "'Process Values," 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Summers]; Tribe, Structural
Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975); Verkuil, A Stud ofInformalAdjudication Procedures,43 U. CHI. L. REv. 739 (1976); Note, Specfying the ProceduresRequired
by Due Process." Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Limits on Use ofInterest Balancing].
67. This particular set of designations is borrowed from Cramton, .4 Comment on TrialType Hearingsin Nuclear Power PlantSiting, 58 VA. L. REV. 585, 592-9 3 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Cramton].
68. Summers, supra note 66, at 3.
69. This has often presented problems for local zoning authorities. See text accompanying note 3 supra; Shapiro, The Zoning Variance Power-Constructi'ein Theory, Destruc-
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curacy is not only a goal for each decision, but embodies an aggregate
goal of uniform results where similarly situated persons are involved.7"
The Supreme Court has identified accuracy as a key factor in its
balancing test,7 ' and the accuracy goal has been widely recognized by
lower courts. However, in ruling on procedural challenges, courts have
often failed to recognize that the goal is to obtain not just a rational

decision, but the most rational decision. More specifically, procedural
due process is not just a tool for preventing decisions so arbitrary or
irrational that they violate substantive due process; rather, its goal is

accuracy for its own sake. Courts often fail to make this distinction.
For example, in his Eastlake opinion, Chief Justice Burger stated that
subsequent judicial review is a palliative for the problems of standardless delegation raised by the Ohio Supreme Court, and those of lack of
notice and fair hearing raised by the dissenters.7 2 This is a relatively

easy argument to make in the zoning field, given the considerable life
left in substantive due process review in zoning law,73 and the fact that
speedy determinations are generally not required in land use cases.74
However, substantive due process review of agency decisions is limited

to a mere check for arbitrariness or irrationality. This limitation is to
prevent judicial encroachment on executive and legislative prerogatives
and to retain the efficiency behind specialized administrative decision
making by avoiding de novo review.7 5

In contrast, procedural due process can be required by the courts
with much less intrusion into the affairs of the other branches of government and without a wasteful repetition of the agency process in the

courtroom. Justice Cardozo recognized this distinction in his opinion
for a unanimous court in Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities
76
Commission:

five in Practice,29 MD. L. REv. 3, 17 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Shapiro]; United States v.
Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975) (conviction of zoning
official for extortion).
70. See Cramton, supra note 67, at 592; Mashaw, supra note 66, at 53.
71. See note 65 supra.
72. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 677 (1976).
73. See, e.g., Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d
381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, appealdismissedand cert. denied, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
74. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.10 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
I K. DAVIS, TREATISE], listing Supreme Court cases holding that where time is not essential,
due process is satisfied by judicial review.
75. See id See also City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. at 694-95
n.16 (1966) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. 301 U.S. 292 (1937) (citations omitted). See also Rosenzweig, From Euclid to
Eastlake-Towarda Unofed Approach to Zoning Change Requests, 82 DICK. L. REV. 59, 72
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Rosenzweig].
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Regulatory commissions have been invested with broad powers
within the sphere of duty assigned to them by law. Even in
quasi-judicial proceedings their informed and expert judgment
exacts and receives a proper deference from courts when it has
been reached with due submission to constitutional restraints [citing cases concerning substantive due process and takings] ...
Indeed, much that they do within the realm of administrative discretion is exempt from supervision if those restraints have been
obeyed. All the more insistent is the need, when such power has
been bestowed so freely, that the "inexorable safeguard". . . of a
fair and open hearing be maintained in its integrity. . . . The
right to such a hearing is one of "the rudiments of fair play"...
assumed to every litigant by the Fourteenth Amendment as a
minimal requirement. 7
Thus, courts should demand accurate procedures as a separate and distinct requirement of constitutional due process.
Acceptability, the court's second goal in determining proper due
process procedures, involves several interrelated values mentioned by
various commentators.7 8 First, there is a regard for individual dignity
and self-respect.7 9 A hearing may allow the participant to see the
strength of the opposing position, or provide time for him to adjust to
an adverse decision.80 Closely akin to this is the importance to a democratic society of individual participation in government-the need to
give everyone his "day in court." Acceptability also involves "process
legitimacy", 8 1 i e., impressing upon citizens the idea that decision makers are doing a good job in order to elicit compliance, curtail alienation
and engender repose based on the belief that a fair and final decision
has been made. Legitimacy is partly earned when citizens believe that
authorities are accurate decision makers and free of corruption and
bias. Although acceptability values are emphasized by legal commen77. Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 304-05 (1937).
78. See note 66 supra.
79. But see Michelman, supra note 66, which contends that is is impossible for courts to
successfully interject these "interpersonal" aims into agency procedures. However,
Michelman's conclusion seems to rest on the assumption that the failure to provide due
process results from a total lack of good faith by the agency. In most instances, ignorance
and laziness are probably the cause of the problem, and this can be cured by a judicial
reminder of constitutional requirements.
There is evidence that in the very first land use decisions, due process was afforded
based upon dignity considerations alone. As described in Genesis, when God decided to
exlude Adam and Eve from their use and enjoyment of Paradise, a divine hearing was held
to inquire of Adam if he had eaten the forbidden fruit. According to the Midrash, the
inquiry was not because of any possibility of error, but to afford Adam a moment to regain
his composure. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 554 (1978).
80. See Subrin & Dykstra, supra note 66, at 456.
81. Summers, supra note 66, at 2.
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tators, the Supreme Court has generally failed to acknowledge their
importance in its procedural due process decisions.8 2 In Goldberg v.
Kelly,8 3 however, the Court mentioned the need to promote individual
dignity, and in Morrissey v. Brewer,8 4 the process legitimacy goal was
noted. The Court recently restated the need for individual dignity and
process legitimacy in Carey v.P#phus,85 a case dealing with section

198386 damages for due process violations: "[A] purpose of procedural
due process is to convey to the individual a feeling that the government

has dealt with him fairly, as well as to minimize the risk of mistaken
deprivations of protected interests."8' 7 It is an open question whether

the courts will afford acceptability values explicit consideration, particularly given the obvious difficulty in identifying and quantifying their
importance inparticular cases.
Efficiency, the last goal, is well recognized by the Supreme Court88
and lower tribunals. It provides the basis for the Court's test balancing

the severity of the potential loss to the individual against administrative
costs. The efficiency value can be directly quantified in terms of the
monetary cost of the time and effort expended. When this value is ap-

plied along with the accuracy and acceptability values, the balancing
test involves weighing the size of the individual's interest multiplied by
the accuracy and acceptability fostered by a particular procedure
against the costs of that procedure to the government, and, hence, soci89
ety.

HI. Legislative-Adjudicative Distinction
A basic tenet of procedural due process is that it applies only to
adjudicative9 ° decisions, and not to legislative acts.9 ' This distinction is
82. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 505-06 (1978).

83. 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970).
84. 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972).
85. 435 U.S. 247, 261-62 (1978).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
87. 435 U.S. 247, 262.
88. See note 65 supra.
89. It has been noted that such explicit balancing recreates the very majoritarianism
that due process and other Bill of Rights guarantees are designed to prevent. E.g., Note,
Limits on Use ofInterest Balancing,supra note 66, at 1523-27. But if the acceptability value
is taken into account, this result may be avoided. See id at 1538-42.
90. As used in this article, "adjudicative" describes both judicial (by courts) and quasijudicial (by agencies) acts, though the article is concerned primarily with agency actions.
"Legislative" will be used to describe actions taken not only by elective bodies, but also by
quasi-legislative lawmaking or rulemaking agencies. Some cases have used the term "administrative" where "adjudicative" would be appropriate. There is a separate legislativeadministrative distinction, which is similar to the distinction between legislative and adjudi-
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essentially a third step which must be added to the Roth formulation,9 2
since a legislative label will prevent a court from even reaching the
question of how much process is due an individual. As many zoning
decisions are made by municipal legislatures or by bodies that could be
viewed as delegates of those legislatures, this has been a major hurdle
to parties seeking to prove constitutional violations in zoning decisions.93 Litigation in Oregon bears this out. Since the Oregon Supreme
Court decision in Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners,9 which
limited the application of the legislative label, the Oregon Supreme
Court and Court of Appeal have decided at least fifteen zoning cases
where procedural due process was at issue.95
This section of the article will analyze the legislative-adjudicative
distinction and then advocate that the distinction no longer serves as a
separate and complete bar to due process relief, but that it be incorporated into the process-due balancing of the Roth test.
A.

Traditional Formulation of the Distinction

The legislative-adjudicative distinction has been formulated in
several similar ways.9 6 In Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. Boardof Equal-

ization,97 Justice Holmes distinguished between acts which apply to
many citizens and those which apply to only a few. In terms of process
cative actions, but the former is based on state common law, and is not used for determining
the applicability of constitutional due process. See Comment, The Iniliative and Referendum's Use in Zoning, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 74, 93-94 (1976).
91. Compare Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) with Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v.
Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
92. See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
93. E.g., South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,419 U.S
837 (1974); Higginbotham v. Barrett, 473 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1973); Montgomery County v.
Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. 686, 376 A.2d 483, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1067 (1978).
94. 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973). Although the Fasano court ne%er specifically mentioned the due process clause, the Oregon Court of Appeal later interpreted Fasano to be
based on constitutional authority. West v. City of Astoria, 18 Or. App. 212, 524 P.2d 1216
(1974).
95. See some of the cases cited in Coon, The Initial CharacterizationofLand Use Decisions, 6 ENVT'L L. 121, 137-38 (1975); and South of Sunnyside Neighborhood League v.
Board of Comm'rs, 280 Or. 3, 569 P.2d 1063 (1977); Petersen v. Mayor and Council of
Klamath Falls, 279 Or. 249, 566 P.2d 1193 (1977); Green v. Hayward, 275 Or. 693, 552 P.2d
815 (1976); Neuberger v. City of Portland, 37 Or. App. 13, 586 P.2d 351 (1978); Wes Linn
Land Co. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 36 Or. App. 39, 583 P.2d 1159 (1978); Bd. of Comm'rs
of Clackamas County v. Dep't of Land Conservation and Dev., 35 Or. App. 725, 582 P.2d 59
(1978); Peterson v. City Council of Lake Oswego, 32 Or. App. 181, 574 P.2d 326 (1978);
Bienz v. City of Dayton, 29 Or. App. 761, 566 P.2d 904 (1977).
96. See generall 1 K. DAVIS, TREATISE, supra note 74, at 412-32.
97. 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915). Accord, Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 167 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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values this is an important distinction. It is less likely that authorities
will be corrupted where there are many individuals concerned. An adverse decision may be easier to accept if it applies to many people.
Moreover, requiring hearings when many persons are involved will
create a much greater administrative burden.
More recently, Professor Davis has advocated distinguishing between "legislative facts" and "adjudicative facts." 98 The former are the
answers to questions of law, policy or discretion, while the latter are
facts concerning the what, when and why of particular situations and
are used to determine whether a situation fits within a certain law or
rule. Davis contends that only adjudicative facts present clear, specific
questions of truth, making a trial-type hearing valuable. The legislative facts-adjudicative facts distinction looks to the accuracy value,
tempered by an efficiency-motivated desire to employ administrative
hearings only when they will increase the accuracy of the decision. 99
Finally, courts sometimes look to the nature of the decision-making body. According to this view, members of a legislative body receive
input from their constituents and do not need a hearing to gather further information. If a decision is "democratically inaccurate," then the
decision makers will be removed from office. There is no need for notice and a hearing since the legislature is generally subject to public
scrutiny and debate, and acts only upon adequate knowledge and after
full consideration. °00 It is also more difficult to unduly influence an
entire legislature. For these reasons, acts of Congress or state legislatures are never susceptible to procedural due process attack. However,
where lawmaking authority is delegated or a municipal body is involved, it is uncertain whether this exception still applies.
B. The Distinction in the Zoning Area
A majority of jurisdictions distinguish zoning actions as either legislative or adjudicative on the basis of the decision-making body and
the label of the change. Generally, enactments and amendments of
zoning ordinances and comprehensive plans by elected bodies are regarded as legislative, while variances, permits and exceptions approved
by boards of adjustment or appeal are deemed quasi-judicial.' 0 Zon98. 1 K. DAVIS, TREATISE, supra note 74, § 7.02. See Langevin v. Chenango Court,
Inc., 447 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, C.J.) (applying distinction).
99. Id.
100. See Southern Ry. Co. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190, 197 (1933); Comment, Due Process
Rights of Paricpationin 4dministrative Rulemaking, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 886, 889 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Due ProcessRights of Participation].
101. See I R. ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 3.14; 2 R. ANDERSON, id § 18.04; 8 E. Mc-
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ing commissions, if they make any final decisions, are considered to be
able to take either type of action, depending on the perceived delegation.1" 2 These classifications are a direct application of the nature-ofthe-body approach to the legislative-adjudicative distinction.0 3 They
are based secondarily on a determination of whether policy is made or
applied, and whether legislative or adjudicative facts are involved." °
Several recent decisions, however, have rejected making a distinction simply on the basis of whether the rezoning decision was made by
a legislative or judicial body.'0 5 According to these cases, although initial formulation of an entire zoning ordinance and major amendments
to ordinances retain a legislative character, where a municipal legislature rezones a small parcel
of land, affecting just a few owners, the
10 6
quasi-judicial.
is
action
This refinement is preferable for several reasons. For one, city
councils or county commissions "are simply not the equivalent in all
respects of state and national legislatures."'' I0 Municipal bodies are
often small, and therefore more susceptible to undue influence. They
are also less subject to public scrutiny. Moreover, as rezoning often
affects only a few landowners, these citizens are almost powerless to
QUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.54 (3d ed. 1976); SA E. MCQUILLIN,
id § 25.230; 1 E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 5-3 (2d ed. 165); 2 E. YOKLEY,
id § 14-1; Coon, The InitialCharacterizationofLand Use Decisions, 6 E' VT'L L. 121, 121 &
n.l (1975) [hereinafter cited as Coon, Initial Characterization];Cunningham, Rezoning by
Amendment as an Administrative or Quasi-JudicialAct." The "New LooA ""in Michigan Zoning, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1341-42 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Cunningham]; Comment,
ZoningAmendments-TheProductof Judicialor Quasi-JudicialAction,33 OHIO ST. L.J. 130,
130 (1972); Developments-Zoning, supra note 27, at 1508-13; Recent Decisions-Zoning,8
GA. L. REV. 254, 256-57 & n.15 (1973).
102. 3A E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 25.224, .227 (3d ed.

1976). Of course, if a zoning commission is legislative by virtue of delegation rather than
election, many of the reasons for not requiring procedures are inapplicable. See generally
Due ProcessRights of Participation,supra note 100, at 889.
103. See text accompanying note 100, supra.

104. See note 98 and accompanying text, supra.
105. E.g., Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709 (D.N.J. 1976);
Donovan v. Clarke, 222 F. Supp. 632 (D.D.C. 1963); Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 542 P.2d
371 (Colo. 1975); O'Meara v. City of Norwich, 167 Conn. 579, 356 A.2d 906 (1975); City of
Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1971); Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs &
Markets, Inc., 89 Nev. 533, 516 P.2d 1234 (1973); Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264
Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327
(1972). See Booth, A Realistic Reexamination of Rezoning Procedure: The Complementary
Requirements ofDue Processand JudicialReview, 10 GA. L. REV. 753 k1976); Coon, Initial
Characterization,supra note 101; Cunningham, supra note 101; Wolfstone, The Casefor a
ProceduralDue ProcessLimitation on the Zoning Referendum: City of Eastlake Revisited, 7
ECOLOGY L.Q. 51, 82-84 (1978); Recent Decisions-Zoning,8 GA. L. REV. 254 (1973).
106. See text accompanying note 101 supra.

107. Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (Or. 1973).
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remedy an adverse decision at the polls. 0 8
In addition, rezoning does not always involve questions of broad
policy. Under the traditional zoning model,"0 9 policy is set (explicitly
or implicitly) by the ordinance, and any variation from the official map
is made-following guidelines in the ordinance-by the board of ad-

justment's grant of nonconforming use permits, special exceptions and
variances. Ideally, a variance or permit will only be granted for cases
of unusual hardship where the proposed use would not upset the existing zoning scheme. On the other hand, rezoning amendments are
basic changes in policy which reflect changed conditions within the
community." 0
But this ideal is far from reality. The model is based on a "static
end-state" conception' of the community, although scholars and
planners now recognize that the dynamics of growth require more flexibility and change." 2 In this context, it is probably impossible to distinguish those changes in zoning which reflect existing policies and
those which- often impliedly-create new ones."l 3 Moreover, even if
such line-drawing is possible, it is often neglected. A landowner who
fails to acquire a variance from the zoning commission will often simply try again before the city council, which may be more sympathetic to
pleas of hardship and less mindful of the policies underlying the ex-

isting ordinance or master plan. Zoning amendments may therefore be
quite specific administrative applications of policies or exceptions from
108. See Booth, supra note 105, at 778.
109. See, e.g., STANDARD ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 4; Krasnowiecki, The Basic System of Land Use Control" Legislative Pre-regulation v. Adainistrative Discretion, in
THE NEW ZONING, 3, 6 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Krasnowiecki]; Dukeminier & Stapleton,
supra note 3, at 322; Reps, DiscretionaryPowers of the BoardofZoning Appeals, 20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 280, 282-88 (1955); Rosenzweig, supra note 76, at 64-65; Shapiro, supra
note 69, at 3-9.
110. In addition to this structure there is the comprehensive plan, an "impermanent constitution" which might reflect an even higher policy. See Haar, The MasterPlan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 353 (1955). Thus, even legislative
amendments may be an application of policy and therefore adjudicative. Bross, Circlingthe
SquaresofEuclidianZoning: Zoning PredestinationandPlanningFree Will, 6 ENVT'L L. 97,
98-99 (1975).
111. Under this conception, it is assumed that officials drafting an initial zoning ordinance can determine future development so well that little need be left to the ongoing discretion of officials administering the ordinance.
112. D. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA 63-64 (1971); Krasnowiecki, supra note
109, at 3-7; Rosenzweig, supra note 76, at 64-67.
113. It has been argued that changes which do not reflect existing policies embodied in
an ordinance or master plan do not create new policies, but simply apply unstated ones.
Comment, Zoning Amendments-The Product ofJudicialor Quasi-JudicialAction,33 OHIO
ST. L.J. 130, 138 (1972). Under this view, the policy-application distinction is still blurred.
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other
those policies made by a small group of decisionmakers-in
14
words, adjudicative acts in nearly all respects."
Thus, if certain amendments are to be deemed quasi-judicial, new
criteria are needed to distinguish these decisions from legislative acts.
The Oregon courts, following the Fasano decision, have suggested
three considerations that are helpful in making such a distinction: 1)
the party initiating the change, 2) the size of the parcel affected, and 3)
the number of affected owners and the diversity of their interests. 5
Under the first criterion, if a private party initiates the zoning
change, then it is adjudicative; while the amendments initiated by the
local government are legislative." 6 Although this approach conforms
to the traditional reasoning that adjudicative decisions address individual situations and legislative decisions set broad policy, it ignores the
fact that the landowners' and neighbors' interests and the facts and policies at issue might be the same no matter who proposed the change. It
could be argued that decisionmakers are less prone to undue outside
influence where they themselves have proposed a change, but this
would not necessarily be true where the zoning commission proposes to
the city council that it amend the ordinance or master plan. Additionally, where the council members are the proponents of the change, then
their own prejudice toward the proposal makes a hearing desirable. It
could also be argued that the government's own proposal will always
be adequately heard, but in that situation procedures are especially
needed to ensure that those who oppose the government will be notified
of the proposal and given an opportunity to present their views.
The second criterion, the size of the parcel,' is a more logical
distinction, but only to the extent that size correlates to the number of
owners affected. It would therefore be better to look directly to that
characteristic.
The number of owners, the third criterion employed by the Ore114. See text accompanying note 101 supra.
115. Coon, InitialCharacterization,supra note 101, at 126-31. See also South of Sunnyside Neighborhood League v. Board of Comm'rs, 280 Or. 3, 559 P.2d 1063, 1071 n.5 (1977).
The footnote in Sunnyside also lists the kinds of standards governing the decisionmakers as
a factor. However, what the court meant by this brief reference is unclear.
116. Coon, Initial Characterization,supra note 101, at 128-29.
117. See id at 128, noting that in the Oregon Court of Appeal decisions since Fasano,
quasi-judicial standards were applied to acts involving up to 32 acres, while the smallest
tract affected by an act deemed legislative was 65 acres. However, in Green v. Hayward, 275
Or. 693, 552 P.2d 815 (1976), the Oregon Supreme Court labeled quasi-judicial the rezoning
of two parcels totalling 140 acres that were owned by a single corporation. In Petersen v.
Mayor and Council of Klamath Falls, 279 Or. 249, 566 P.2d 1193 (1977), the court held an
annexation of 141 acres, owned by four parties, to be a quasi-judicial act.

Summer 19791

ZONING DECISIONS

gon courts, is closely related to the process values which the legislativeadjudicative distinction should serve. Decisions involving a few owners will most likely involve specific adjudicative facts and the application of policy, so that a trial-type hearing will result in the most
accurate determination. An impartial tribunal and clear standards of
decision will also be more effective in preventing arbitrariness. On the
other hand, where many citizens are affected the action may be remedied on election day. The number of parties is also a good indication
of when corruption should be anticipated. As one commentator has
noted, "Acres of land are not likely to exert sinister influences on local
decisionmaking bodies, but owners are."'11 In addition, the goal of acceptability" 9 is more easily reached where many persons have input
into a decision. Finally, administrative costs will be greater where
more landowners are involved.
The decisions on comprehensive plans made by zoning commissions, planning boards (even where elected), or town councils should be
evaluated in the same way. Although normally a plan is by nature a
comprehensive, policy-laden document, it too can be amended piecemeal by authorities. In fact, in some jurisdictions it is routinely altered
whenever an amendment is made. 2 ° In one case, on due process
grounds, the Oregon Court of Appeal required a city council to hold a
amend a comprehensive plan to
trial-type hearing before it could
12 1
plot.
5.29-acre
single
a
change
C. Alternative to the Legislative -Adjudicative

Distinction

Reliance on the number of owners involved, when coupled with a
lesser consideration of the size of the parcel, the decisionmaking body
and the type of change, will guide a court fairly well in deciding when
adjudicative procedures are more beneficial. However, it is suggested
that there be no threshold distinction at all. As the first half of the Roth
test 122 eliminates only de minimis interests, allowing the second step,
balancing, to properly allocate lesser procedures to smaller interests,
the legislative-adjudicative distinction should be used to wholly deny
118. Coon, Initial Characterization,supra note I01, at 130. The author notes that in
every Oregon decision after Fasano in which quasi-judicial action was found, only one owner was affected. But see Petersen v. Mayor and Council of Klamath Falls, 279 Or. 249, 566
P.2d 1193 (1977) (four-owner decision is adjudicative).
119. See text accompanying notes 78-87 supra.
120. See Mandelker, The Role of the Local ComprehensivePlan in Land Use Regulation,
74 MICH. L. REv. 899, 946 n.191 (1976).
121. Marggi v. Ruecker, 20 Or. App. 669, 533 P.2d 1372 (1975).
122. See text accompanying note 23, supra.

1034

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 6:1011

due process protection only to what might be called "de maximis" interests-those laws passed by state legislatures and Congress. Acts by
local legislatures and commissions would be subject to due process protection, though limited by a legislative-adjudicative sliding scale of
concerns-that is, those concerns outlined above " 23- employed as part
of the Roth balancing test.
One reason for abolishing a strict distinction at the local level is
that, at least in the zoning area, even a criterion based on the number of
individual affected has significant problems. For one, even the most
wide-ranging zoning decisions must rely on information concerning
specific plots of land. For instance, if a zoning commission must
choose between two large areas for establishing an industrial district, its
decision should be made based on the beneficial and adverse impact on
those holding land in and near the target areas, as well as the effects on
the community as a whole. Planning expertise alone will not enable a
zoning authority to gauge the total aggregate effect. An airing of individual views--even if elaborate hearings for everyone are impossiblewould inevitably provide valuable information. Furthermore, a peculiar characteristic of zoning is that any decision involves boundaries,
for which decisions must be made between individual plots of land.'24
Thus, specific information will be much more valuable to zoning authorities than it would be, for example, to administrators setting industry-wide transportation rates or trade practice rules.
Second, legislative-adjudicative distinctions, when used to deny
procedural due process where large and varied interests are involved,
seem to contravene the Supreme Court's rulings that the size of the
interest should determine the amount of process due. 2 ' It is not hard
to imagine an owner arguing on the one hand that the property interests involved are small enough that no existing policies need be reconsidered and consequently the zoning decision should be considered
quasi-judicial, but contending on the other hand that his interests are
so large as to justify a trial-type hearing on his objections. This anomaly is really nothing new; it is simply a recasting of the Supreme
Court's test, balancing the size of the individual's interest and the ability of a hearing to clarify the individual's argument against the administrative burden on the government. Given this parallel, the balancing
test alone could serve constitutional interests more directly and coher123. See text accompanying notes 115-21 supra.
124. It should be noted that variances and exceptions provide alternative quasi-judicial
relief for an individual placed on the wrong side of a boundary.
125. See note 55, supra.
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ently than two separate judicial tests with apparently contradictory results.
A third reason for eliminating the adjudicative threshold requirement is that, given the difficulty of drawing lines between quasi-judicial
and legislative zoning actions, 126 results are inevitably harsh when
large interests fall just above the adjudicative line and are wholly
denied constitutional redress. The Roth de minimis threshold and process-due balancing tests are designed to avoid such results. Incorporat-

ing the legislative-adjudicative considerations into the balancing test
and leaving only a "de maximis" cutoff for purely legislative acts would
promote fair treatment for individuals, the main purpose of constitutional due process.
In several cases involving administrative decisions related to housing and redevelopment, the federal courts have required certain minimal procedures even though explicit legislative acts were involved. In
Powelton Civic Home Owners' Association v. Departmentof HUD, 2 7 a
group of residents sought notice and a hearing after the government
126. The general difficulty involved in this line-drawing has been recognized in both
cases and commentary. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co.,
410 U.S. 224, 245 (1973), noted that the line is "not always a bright one .. " The D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals has used stronger language: "In many cases, it is unnecessary, and
even unwise, to classify a given proceeding as either adjudicatory or [legislative] rulemaking.
The line between the two is frequently a thin one. . . .[O]bsession with attempts to place
agency action in the proper category may often obscure the real issue. . . ." City of Chicago v. Federal Power Comm'n, 458 F.2d 731, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See a similar statement
by Professor Davis, in his TREATISE, supra note 74, § 7.02. See also I F. COOPER, STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 142 (1965): "The suggestion is found in some of the older cases (and
in some texts) that in determining the constitutional necessity of notice and hearing, an
important factor is the classification of the agency's function as legislative or judicial. The
suggested rule is that a hearing is required if the agency is exercising judicial functions, and
is not required if the agency is exercising legislative functions.
"This supposed test cannot, however, be relied on as an actual guide to decision. While
some courts do apparently give some weight to the classification of the agency's function as
legislative or judicial, in deciding whether there exists a constitutional right to notice and
hearing (and are more inclined to insist on the allowance thereof if the agency's function is
judicial) it is believed that these labels have always played a much smaller part in actual
judicial decision than in opinion writing. The labelling of a function as judicial or legislative was often the result of, rather than the basis of, the court's decision on the constitutional
question. In any event, it is clear that the nature of the agency's function is not often spoken
of, in current decisions, as the basis for decision on the constitutional issue. In fact, hearings
are required in some types of cases where the agency's function is essentially legislative in
character, if the considerations [related to process values] . . ., dictate the advisibility of
insisting on a hearing." Justice Newman of the California Supreme Court recently advocated elimination of the legislative-adjudicative distinction in the zoning area. Horn v.
County of Ventura, 24 Cal. 3d 605, 620-21, 596 P.2d 1134, 1142-43, 156 Cal. Rptr. 718, 727,
(1979) (Newman, J., concurring).
127. 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
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moved to condemn a large parcel of land for redevelopment. The court
conceded that since legislative, not adjudicative, facts were involved in
the question of the razing of the neighborhood, a trial-type hearing
would be of little value; in addition, taking testimony from each of the
residents would be an overwhelming administrative burden. The court
concluded, however, that the Constitution nonetheless required some
procedures, and held that the residents should be able to submit written
128
and documentary evidence.
Other courts have also found such a "paper hearing" constitutionally required where questions of general policy affecting many individuals were at stake. Several of these cases involved rent increases in

public or publicly-subsidized housing. Although general questions of
policy were involved, and the increases involved numerous residents,

these courts required a paper hearing along with other procedural protections, including notice of the increase, an opportunity to inspect the
29
landlord's application for the increase, and a statement of reasons.1

Thus, a paper hearing, accompanied by notice, standards and a
statement of reasons, has relatively low administrative costs even if

many individuals are involved. It provides information, thereby promoting accurate decisions and serves to legitimize those decisions to the
citizenry. Even where policy issues are involved, individual input may

still be valuable. Therefore, an adjudicative threshold requirement for
due process protection is undesirable. Instead, courts should infuse the

considerations behind the legislative-adjudicative distinction into the
Roth balancing test, as the courts in the public housing cases seem to
128. Id at 835.
129. Caramico v. Department of HUD, 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974) (notice and paper
hearing); Geneva Towers Tenants Org. v. Federated Mortgage Inv., 504 F.2d 483 (9th Cir.
1974) (notice paper hearing, and reasons); Burr v. New Rochell Mun. Hous. Auth., 479 F.2d
1165 (2d Cir. 1973) (notice paper hearing and reasons); Argo v. Hills, 425 F. Supp. 151
(E.D.N.Y. 1977) (notice, paper hearing, opportunity to inspect application and written decision); 515 Associates v. City of Newark, 424 F. Supp. 984 (D.N.J. 1977) (same). In two other
cases, the court justified a due process requirement by finding adjudicative facts at issue,
although many tenants were affected by a single increase. Thompson v. Washington, 497
F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Leventhal, J.) (paper hearing required by Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1402, although due process used by court to "inform our construction of the statute ..
"); Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, C.J.)
(but no process required because insufficient state involvement). Contra, Hahn v. Gottlieb,
430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 1970) (no due process where legislative facts and many individuals
involved). See also Judge Hufstedler's dissent in Geneva Towers, 504 F.2d at 498 ("The
great procedural protections of due process are reduced by the majority to little more than a
right to send and receive mail."); Sinaiko, Due ProcessRights ofParticifpationin Administralive Rulemaking, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 886 (1975); Note, The JudicialRole in Def1ning ProceduralRequirementsforAgency Rulemaking, 87 HARV. L. REv. 782 (1974).
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have done sub silentio. Zoning changes will thus require at least a paper hearing in order to meet constitutional standards of fairness.
IV.

Process Due

One of the principal values of the administrative process is its flexibility. While the due process clause was intended to protect individuals from unfair or arbitrary decisions, the Roth balancing test is
designed, at the same time, to preserve administrative flexibility. As a
result, a court has wide latitude in considering the value of a particular
procedure in a particular situation, and the extent of constitutional protection to which a particular individual is entitled. Therefore, much
law is made case by case.
In the zoning context, the multitude of administrative structures
which exist in different municipalities exacerbates this uncertainty. For
example, in one community permission to build an apartment is obtained by getting a permit from an elected county council vested with
absolute discretion, while another community may require amendments to both a master plan and relevant zoning ordinances which
must be approved by an appointed zoning board upon the recommendation of an appointed zoning commission. This disparity in administrative frameworks suggests that case-by-case litigation is necessary to
clarify the minimum procedures constitutionally required of these deciding bodies.
Since it is clearly impractical to obtain judicial rulings to cover
every situation and locality, decision makers will continue to follow
those procedures mandated by statute and municipal ordinance as well
as to develop their own rules. Nevertheless, vigilant protection of due
process rights by the courts is necessary to prod lawmakers and administrators into developing fair and comprehensive codes of procedure for
zoning agencies.
This article will not discuss the legislative question of what might
be the most prudent procedural rules, as that issue is the topic of a vast
quantity of zoning cases and commentary. Rather, the following commentary will outline those procedural safeguards which the Constitution might require. Given the multiplicity of types of administrative
agencies and zoning controversies, it is impossible to draw specific
guidelines here; only a general discussion of procedural problems and
the applicable constitutional law will be provided.'30 Federal and state
130. No attempt will be made to discuss what safeguards beyond those required by the
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court decisions which have explicitly dealt with constitutional due
process challenges will be noted.
Before examining each procedural safeguard separately, it might
be helpful to note a few points with respect to the Roth balancing test
as it is applied in the zoning context. First, land is at the core of traditional notions of property."' Given the Burger Court's emphasis on
constitutional text and the protection of traditional interests, ownership
of land should be provided maximum protection.132 Second, as a result
of the narrow protection provided by the taking clause under current
34
interpretation,' 33 wide discretion is exercised by zoning agencies.'
Much of this discretion is used not only in formulating original plans
and ordinances, but also in determining amendments and variances.' 35
Therefore, proceedings before these agencies often involve crucial determinations of property rights. Third, land use controls involve perhaps "more subtle considerations of public welfare" 36 than most other
local administrative controls. Finally, for several reasons, local zoning
bodies- especially in comparison to federal agencies-are prone to
making less accurate and less publicly acceptable decisions. This is because the officials are often laymen, lacking legal knowledge; the members are often under great outside pressure from affected citizens with
whom they live and do business; and such "minor" official agencies
receive less scrutiny from the press and scholars. 37 Given these factors, courts should be particularly careful in weighing the interests of
individual appearing before zoning agencies.
A.

Notice

Judge Friendly has written that proper notice, along with an opportunity to be heard and an impartial tribunal, is a "fundamental"
aspect of due process. 138 According to the Supreme Court, notice must
U.S. Constitution are required by state constitutions, as state courts have rarely held that
their constitutions impose additional procedural requirements. See note 11 supra.
131. See notes 26-28 and accompanying text supra.
132. For a discussion of whether land should be given special protection over other
forms of property, compare the majority and dissenting opinions in San Diego Bldg. Contr.
Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1974), appeal dimissed, 427 U.S. 901 (1976).
133. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
134. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
135. See notes 112-113 and accompanying text supra.
136. R. Babcock, Brief in Eastlake, supra note 3, at 14.
137. Dukeminier & Stapleton, supra note 3, at 332-33. See also I F. COOPER, STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 4 (1965).

138. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1280 (1975). Various

courts have invoked the constitutional need for notice in the zoning context. See, e.g., Sixth
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be
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections. .

.

.The notice must be

of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information
. ..and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to

make their appearance ... "'
The form of notice is a recurrent issue. The Supreme Court has
struck down notice by publication in a condemnation case, stating: "It
is common knowledge that mere newspaper publication rarely informs
a landowner of proceedings against his property."' 4 ° Yet notice by
publication is a common zoning procedure. 14 1 This procedure, even
when accompanied by posting, is certainly inadequate where only a
few landowners are involved. 142 The law is not as clear where numerous owners are affected, as such action might be deemed legislative,
requiring no notice. 143 If a court looks beyond the legislative-adjudicative distinction, however, notice might be required even where a new
master plan or zoning ordinance is being considered. The Supreme
Court has required mailed notice where the property rights of over one
Camden Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709 (1976); Masters v. Pruce, 290 Ala.
56, 274 So. 2d 33 (1973); Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541, 492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 745 (1972); Trans-Oceanic Oil Corp. v. City of Santa Barbara, 85 Cal. App. 2d 776,
194 P.2d 148 (1948); Bell v. Studdard, 220 Ga. 756, 141 S.E.2d 536 (1965); Sikes v. Pierce,
212 Ga. 567,94 S.E.2d 427 (1956); Calawa v. Town of Litchfield, 112 N.H. 263,296 A.2d 124
(1972); Vandervort v. Sisters of Mercy of Cincinnati, 97 Ohio App. 153, 117 N.E.2d 51
(1952); West v. City of Astoria, 18 Or. App. 212, 524 P.2d 1216 (1974); Cugini v. Chiaradio,
96 R.I. 120, 189 A.2d 798 (1963).
139. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
140. Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956). Accord, Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (requiring notice by mail to beneficiaries of
judicial settlement of trust fund where addresses of recipients were known); Schroeder v.
City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962) (publication and posting insufficient to notify of
partial condemnation where owner's name and address were available in public records).
141. 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 4.13 (2d ed. 1976); 3 id § 20.20;
Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 167 (1971).
App. 3d 988, 331 N.E.2d 67 (1975).
142. American Oil Corp. v. City of Chicago, 29 Ill.
Contra, Helms v. City of Charlotte, 255 N.C. 647, 122 S.E.2d 817 (1961). See also Gulf&
Eastern Dev. Corp. v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 354 So.2d 57 (Fla. 1978) (no notice at all
violates due process).
143. Krimendahl v. Common Council of Noblesville, 256 Ind. 191, 267 N.E.2d 547
(1971) (no notice required where amendment deemed a legislative act); Lawton v. City of
Austin, 404 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (same); Wanamaker v. City Council of El
Monte, 200 Cal. App. 2d 453, 19 Cal. Rptr. 554 (1962) (published notice satisfactory for
adoption of comprehensive plan, labelled a legislative act). See also Nardi v. City of Providence, 89 R.I. 437, 153 A.2d 136 (1959) (publication constitutionally adequate where new
zoning ordinance enacted); Clackamas County v. Emmert, 14 Or. App. 493, 513 P.2d 532
(1973) (publication adequate where amendment affects large area).
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hundred individuals were involved.'" This is not a costly procedure,
45
and addresses would normally be available from municipal records.
Therefore, personal notice to all owners of land who would receive a

significantly different zoning classification under a proposed new ordinance should be constitutionally required.
A tougher question is what notice should be provided neighboring

owners. Several courts have upheld notice by publication as providing
147

adequate due process. 146 However, in Scott v. City of Indian Wells,
the California Supreme Court required personal notice to all owners of
property adjacent to a planned large development, including property
which was outside the zoning authority's jurisdiction."' This seems to

be a reasonable requirement which would impose little burden on zoning agencies. Personal notice to more distal neighbors, however, would
involve a much greater burden. Since this is likely to include a much

larger number of people, published notice might reliably inform at
least a representative sample of these individuals, making it constitutionally acceptable.
The content of the notice should also meet the Supreme Court's

standard of reasonable appraisal. 4 Any notice should include not
only the time, date, and place of the hearing, but it should also provide
an adequate description of the property at issue and the nature of the

proposed change.

50

The latter information should allow a citizen to

ascertain with reasonable effort whether his own property will be af-

fected. 5 ' If many owners are affected by a general proposal such as a
new ordinance or plan, this requirement might be satisfied by making

144. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306. 309 (1950).
145. Unlike class action litigation where tens and even hundreds of thousands of individuals might need to receive notice, zoning changes by municipalities will not normally affect
such a large number of individuals.
146. Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 449, § 4 (1964 & Later Case Serv.). See also Karpenko v. City
of Southfield, 75 Mich. App. 188, 254 N.W.2d 839 (1977); Wood v. Freeman, 43 Misc. 2d
616, 251 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1964), aft'd, 24 App. Div. 2d 704, 262 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1965); Griest v.
Hooey, 205 Misc. 396, 128 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1954); Gazan v. Corbett, 278 App. Div. 953, 105
N.Y.S.2d 187 (1951), aff'd, 304 N.Y. 920, 110 N.E.2d 739 (1953). See Developments-Zoning, supra note 27, at 1519.
147. 6 Cal. 3d 541, 462 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972).
148. Id at 549, 462 P.2d at 1142, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 750. See also Horn v. County of
Ventura, 24 Cal. 3d 605, 596 P.2d 1149, 156 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1979) (striking down notice by
posting in county offices).
149. See text accompanying note 139 supra.
150. See Adler v. Lynch, 415 F. Supp. 705 (D. Neb. 1976) (holding notice constitutionally insufficient where the specific proceeding was not mentioned). See also I R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 4.14 (2d ed. 1976); 3 R. ANDERSON, id § 20.21.
151. Clackamas County v. Emmert, 14 Or. App. 493, 513 P.2d 532, 534 (1973); 8A E.
MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.249 (3d ed. 1976).
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152
maps and proposals available at government offices.
Notice must also be timely. The Standard Zoning Enabling Act
provides for notice at least fifteen days prior to the hearing, 153 and an
Oregon court has upheld notice given ten days in advance. 154 Less
than a week's notice, however, might not offer a "reasonable time for
155
those interested to make their appearance."

B. Hearing
1. Purpose andNature
There are three purposes of a zoning hearing; 1) to inform decision
makers of public opinion on policy issues, 2) to acquaint them with
specific facts concerning affected property, and 3) to give owners an
opportunity to protest decisions concerning their land.' 56 Courts have
rarely been asked to determine the precise ingredients of such a hearing, 157 but it is widely acknowledged that even informal procedures are
permissible if they allow landowners an adequate opportunity to be
heard.' 58 This right to present and rebut evidence 159 extends to information on policy as well as concrete fact.
Yet, the procedures which that right requires may be limited, depending upon the nature of the information sought by the zoning
agency. The gathering of specific, adjudicative facts generally requires
an oral, trial-type proceeding, particularly where credibility is important or where an issue cannot be easily documented. 60 In contrast, a
paper hearing, perhaps accompanied by limited oral testimony, may be
constitutionally adequate for the adoption of ordinances and amendments affecting many citizens' land, especially where legislative facts
are involved and a full hearing for all affected citizens would consumer
inordinate amounts of time and money.
Other possibilities exist, depending on the circumstances. For instance, written presentations, with opportunity given to all parties to
152. See Glaspey & Sons, Inc. v. Conrad, 8 Wash. App. 932, 509 P.2d 762 (1973) (due
process does not require explanation of entire proposed ordinance or reference to official
maps in published notice, where such information is available upon request).
153. See STANDARD ZONING ENABLING ACT,supra note 4, § 4.
154. Clackamas County v. Emmert, 14 Or. App. 493, 513 P.2d 532 (1973).
155. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
156. See I R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 4.11 (2d ed. 1976).
157. Id at § 4.16.
158. Id at 214; 8A E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.263
(3d ed. 1976).
159. Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23, 30 (1973).

160. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343-44 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
269 (1970).
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examine the submissions, may be adequate to deal with legislative facts
where few individuals, but many complex policy questions not adaptable 16 1 to oral testimony and cross-examination, are involved. Thus,
where a proposed amendment would allow one owner to build a shop-

ping center that would have an intense and complex impact on the
community, the right to present oral testimony might be reserved solely
for the owner, since he has a larger property interest than his neighbors
and thus more weight in the Roth balancing test. Conversely, even

where a broad
ordinance is at issue, specific situations may require oral
62
testimony.

1

2. Conduct of Hearing

In the usual case where an oral hearing is necessary, strict rules of
evidence need not be applied, 163 nor is the swearing of witnesses constitutionally required.164 The number of witnesses and length of their testimony may be restricted for accuracy and efficiency reasons. 165
The due process right to cross-examine witnesses has presented a
thornier problem for state courts. 16 6 Although the use of cross-exami161. See 1 K. DAVIS, TREATISE, supra note 74, § 7.20. See also FCC v. WJR, 337 U.S.
265 (1949) (oral hearing not required for efficiency reasons).
162. For example, where a comprehensive proposal changes the classification of many
parcels of land, those whose land would constitute a nonconforming use might be allowed to
testify, while those with vacant land or conforming uses could only present written submissions.
163. 2 K. DAVIS, TREATISE, supra note 74, § 14.01 (strict application of rules not required in administrative hearings); 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 20.31 (2d
ed. 1976); 8A E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.263 (3d ed.

1976) (zoning boards normally do not use strict evidentiary standards).
164. Shellburne, Inc. v. Conner, 269 A.2d 409 (Del. Ch. 1970); South of Sunnyside
Neighborhood League v. Board of Comm'rs, 27 Or. App. 647, 557 P.2d 1375 (1976), rev'don
other grounds, 280 Or. 3, 569 P.2d 1063 (1977). Contra, Humble Oil & Refining Co. v.
Board of Aldermen, 284 N.C. 458, 202 S.E.2d 129 (1974) (dictum). See also 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 20.34 (2d ed. 1976).

165. See text accompanying notes 68-77, 88-89 supra.
166. Courts in three states have denied any constitutional right. Shellburne, Inc. v. Conner, 269 A.2d 409 (Del. Ch. 1970); In re Coleman, 242 So. 2d 602 (La. App. 1970); South of
Sunnyside Neighborhood League v. Board of Comm'rs, 27 Or. App. 647, 557 P.2d 1375
(1976), rev'd on other grounds, 280 Or. 3, 569 P.2d 1063 (1977). See Armstrong v. Zoning
Bd. of Appeals, 158 Conn. 158, 257 A.2d 799 (1969) (lack of cross-examination was harmless
in the particular situation). Two states have held that there is such a right in zoning proceedings. Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971); Bryniarski v. Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 247 Md. 137, 230 A.2d 289 (1967) (denial of right
even where plaintiff was allowed to call other side's witnesses on direct examination); Town
of Somerset v. Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 245 Md. 52, 225 A.2d 294 (1966)
(same). See also Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Board of Aldermen, 284 N.C. 458, 202
S.E.2d 129 (1974) (dictum).
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nation is rare, even before boards of adjustment or appeal, 167 the
Supreme Court has held it to be a fundamental aspect of due process,
at least where questions of fact are in dispute. 168 Where adjudicative
facts are not at issue, however, cross-examination does not serve accuracy values; in fact, it may have a polarizing effect when a decision
maker is attempting to formulate a consensus view, or determine the
1 69
most rational, scientifically correct solution to a planning problem.
Accordingly, a constitutional balance may require cross-examination
only in certain instances, with written interrogatories as an alternative
for particular issues. 170 Considerations of efficiency may require that
17 1
any permitted examination be reasonably limited in time and scope.
In some instances, the due process clause may protect the right to a
public hearing. 172 Given the potential for undue influence on zoning
bodies, 173 such public access particularly serves accuracy and acceptability values. However, the Constitution does not guarantee a room
large enough to accommodate all comers to a controversial hearing.174
3. Right to Counsel
Although the Supreme Court has not granted a right to have an
attorney present in all administrative proceedings, expressing a legitimate concern for problems of polarization and delay, 17 the complexity
and relative formality of zoning hearings, as well as the large property
interests at stake, would seem to demand the right to adequate representation. As the Court itself has pointed out, "Counsel can help delineate the issues, present the factual contentions in an orderly manner,
conduct cross-examination, and generally safeguard the interests of the
[client]."' 176 Presence of counsel is as valuable where broad policy concerns are at issue as when specific factual questions must be answered.
167. 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 20.23 (2d ed. 1976).
168. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1970). But see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 567-68 (1974).
169. See Friendly, Some Kind ofHearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1283-86 (1975).
170. See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 630-31 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (written cross-examination in agency hearing satisfied requirements of enabling statute and common law fundamental fairness).
171. Gibson v. Talbot County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 250 Md. 292, 242 A.2d 137 (1968).
See also Bayer v. Siskind, 247 Md. 116,230 A.2d 316, 320 (1967) (owner of affected land has
more extensive right than other interested parties).
172. Friendly, Some Kind ofHearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1293-94 (1975).
173. See note 3 and accompanying text, supra.
174. Gibson v. Talbot County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 250 Md. 292,242 A.2d 137 (1968).
175. Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970) with Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 569-70 (1974).
176. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970).
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Ex Parte Evidence andArgument

State agencies are especially prone to use ex parte evidence in
making decisions.' 77 Although the Supreme Court has held that a decision "must rest solely on the. . . evidence adduced at the hearing,"' 7 8
it has not prohibited reliance on exparte evidence, as long as it is disclosed at the hearing. 79 This latter approach is probably all that due
process requires in the zoning area, as exparte information is often
important to land use tribunals. In most cases, disclosure of reliance
upon information not introduced at a hearing will provide parties with
sufficient opportunity to respond.
Valuable ex parte information may be obtained from various
sources. Zoning officials should draw upon the technical expertise of
other city officials or planning experts through informal meetings
where the official or expert is not inhibited by the need to present a
formal written report or to prepare testimony and submit to cross-examination. Zoning officials should also be able to personally inspect
land sites that are at issue. Elected officials should be able to consult
with their constituents. 80 Here, an interest in "democratic accuracy"
must be balanced against the accuracy value of prohibiting exparte
evidence. Finally, private, legislative-type bargaining should be allowed where broad, legislative decisions are involved and traditional
notions of fairness will not be violated. This is a particularly delicate
issue, especially since legislators will often fail to disclose most of their
ex parte discussions, but such bargaining is a key to the legislative
process. This is one area where the legislative-adjudicative dichotomy
is given great weight.
If agencies rely on exparte information, they should be required
to place such evidence into the record in order to enable the parties to
respond to it and also to provide courts with the basis for review of
zoning decisions.' 8 '
1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 4 (1965).
178. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271. Accord, Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. PUC, 301 U.S.
292 (1937).
179. See Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
180. See Tierney v. Duris, 21 Or. App. 613, 536 P.2d 435 (1975).
181. A few cases have held exparte evidence and discussions violative of due process in
zoning procedures. Hot Shoppes, Inc. v. Clouser, 231 F. Supp. 825 (DD.C. 1964); Allen v.
Donovan, 43 Del. Ch. 512, 239 A.2d 227 (1968); Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wash.
2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971). See also Peterson v. City Council of Lake Oswego, 32 Or. App.
181, 574 P.2d 326 (1978) (holding no due process violation where minutes of exparte meeting were available and other special circumstances indicated an impartial decision had been
made); West v. City of Astoria, 18 Or. App. 212, 225, 524 P.2d 1216, 1222 (1974) (Schwab,
C.J., concurring and finding an exparte problem).
177.
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C. Initiatives and Referenda
The use of initiatives and referenda has been a source of much
litigation in the last several years. A majority of cases deal with state
law, 8 2 but some courts have considered constitutional due process
challenges. These challenges are of two types. Referenda procedures
have been struck down as violative of due process for impermissibly
delegating power without standards of guide decisions.183 They have
also been 4voided for precluding constitutionally required notice and
8
hearing.'
Both of these problems were present in City of Eastlake v. Forest
City Enterprises,Inc. 8 5 There, the Ohio Supreme Court 8 6 had struck
182. Referenda on zoning questions have been struck down because laws allowing them
were held applicable to legislative, and not administrative, action. E.g., Kelley v. John, 162
Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d 713 (1956); Leonard v. City of .Bothell, 87 Wash. 2d 847, 557 P.2d
1306 (1976). The legislative-administrative distinction is quite similar in application to the
legislative-adjudicative dichotomy and sometimes the two are confused by judges, but the
former is strictly a state law doctrine. See Comment, The InitiativeandReferendum's Use in
Zoning, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 74, 93-94 (1976). Initiatives and referenda have also been challenged for not providing the notice, hearing, and other procedures required by state zoning
laws. E.g., Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473,
135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976); Elliott v. Clawson, 21 Mich. App. 363, 175 N.W.2d 821 (1970). Use
of these two devices has been the source of much recent commentary, particularly after the
Eastlake decision. See Hogue, Eastlake andArlingtonHeights. New Hurdles in Regulations
Land Use?, 28 CASE W. L. REv. 42 (1977); Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated- Warth v.
Seldin and City ofEastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,Inc., 91 HARV. L. REv. 1373, 1402-25
(1978); WOLFSTONE, The Casefor a ProceduralDue ProcessLimitation on the Zoning Referendum: City fEastlake Revisisted,7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 51 (1978); Note, 5 ConstitutionalLawZoning Referenda-MandatoryReferenda on All Municipal Land Use Changes Do Not Violate the Due ProcessClause, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 141 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Fordham
Note]; Developments-Zoning,supra note 127, at 1530-42; Note, Land Use Planningandthe
Public: Zoning by Initiative, 36 MONT. L. REV. 301 (1975); Note, Zoning and the Referendun" Converging Powers, Conflicting Processes, 6 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 97
(1977); Note, Adjudication by Labels: Referendum Rezoning and Due Process, 55 N.C. L.
REV. 517 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Adjudicationby Labels]; Note, The Proper Use ofReferenda in Zoning, 29 STAN. L. REv. 819 (1977); Note, Preserving"The Blessings of Quiet Seclusion" The Eastlake Decisionanda Community's Right to ControlGrowth, 1977 U. ILL. L.F.
895; Comment, Voter Zoning- DirectLegislation andMunicipalPlanning, 1969 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
453; Comment, The Initiativeand Referendum's Use in Zoning, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 74 (1976);
Comment, Forest City Enterprises,Inc. v. City ofEastlake: Zoning Referenda and Exclusionary Zoning, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 635 (1975); Comment, The Erumpent Power of the Initiative, Growth Control Ordinances, and the Regional Welfare: A Comment on Associated
Homebuildersof the GreaterEastbay,Inc. v. City ofLivermore, I HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 515
(1977); Comment, Referendum Zoning- The State and FederalIssues and a Suggested Approach, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 907 (1977); Comment, Zoning and the Use ofthe Initiative, 1975
U. ILL. L.F. 693.
183. E.g., City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 204, 439 P.2d 290 (1968); Marta
v. Sullivan, 248 A.2d 608 (Del. 1968).
184. E.g., City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 204, 439 P.2d 290 (1968).
185. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
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down an Eastlake, Ohio ordinance authorizing referenda on zoning
matters, finding that the ordinance sub judice was an impermissible
standardless delegation. This decision was based on two early U.S.
Supreme Court cases, Eubank v. City of Richmond, 87 and Washington
Ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 88 which had invalidated ordinances delegating zoning decisions to neighboring property owners.
The Supreme Court reversed the Ohio court judgment, holding that a
referendum involving all citizens of a city could not be an impermissible delegation because it was not a delegation at all, but simply a reservation of power held by the voters. 189
Justice Stevens dissented,' 90 asserting that the Eastlake scheme violated due process not only because there were no standards, but also
because the plaintiff was not provided notice or a hearing before an
impartial tribunal prior to the rejection of the proposed zone change.
He contended that due process was required, despite the Ohio Supreme
Court's labelling of the decision as legislative, because the controversy
dealt with "particular issues involving specific uses of specific parcels." 191
The majority position on standardless delegation is unfortunate.
The nondelegation doctrine might have proved useful to limit some
types of delegation to private persons. For example, the Court might
have distinguished and permitted referenda on legislative issues, while
allowing courts to continue to read the due process clause as prohibiting standardless delegations to voters of adjudicative questions. 192 On
the other hand, the Court's decision on reservation of power is clear,
limiting the
nondelegation doctrine where the entire electorate is in93
volved.

1

186. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 40 Ohio St. 2d 187, 324 N.E.2d 740
(1975).
187. 226 U.S. 137 (1912). But see Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526,
531 (1917), upholding a delegation because neighbors could only remove a restriction, not
impose one.
188. 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
189. 426 U.S. 668, 672 (1976).
190. Id at 680. Justice Stevens was joined by Justice Brennan. Justice Powell also filed
a one-paragraph dissent, basically making the same objections as Justice Stevens. Id
191. Id at 683. Stevens also indicates agreement with recent cases holding that amendments involving only a few parcels or owners are adjudicative. Id See, e.g., Fasano v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 574, 580-81, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (1973), and Fleming v. City
of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 298-99, 502 P.2d 327, 331 (1972).
192. Under the sliding scale of legislative-adjudicative considerations proposed in this
article, such a distinction could still be made.
193. 426 U.S. 668, 678. Of course, states may still prohibit referenda on adjudicative
issues through statutes or by application of the common law legislative-administrative dis-
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What is less clear is whether the majority actually rejected Justice

Stevens' position on the requirements of notice and hearing.' 94 Although the need for these two fundamental safeguards was urged by
certain amici curiae, 95 the lack of notice and hearing was not the express ground for the Ohio Supreme Court decision; the majority there-

fore was not required to address the issue. Chief Justice Burger
emphasized the reservation of power held by voters, and although this
reservation might logically include all procedural due process rights,
the majority opinion could be interpreted as precluding only the
nondelegation doctrine.

If this reading is correct, litigation in other courts concerning the
notice and hearing issue is still significant. While some courts have

struck down zoning ordinances adopted by initiative or referendum because notice and hearing were lacking, 196 other courts have upheld

such ordinances, finding that procedural due process is not required
where essentially legislative matters are involved.197 This conflict may
again be resolved by absorbing legislative-adjudicative considerations
into the Roth balancing test. Where questions on the ballot affect and
interest many voters, public participation in decisions would indeed
further accuracy and acceptability values. On the other hand, where
only a few owners of a single parcel are affected-as in Eastlake-and
the decision to be made requires the evaluation of specific facts, voters

would have much less to contribute, while a formal hearing would be
valuable. Additionally, voters will have less to complain about if they
tinction. See note 182 supra. The latter would accomplish the same goal as due process in
about the same way based on very similar considerations.
194. Compare 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.12 (2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as 1 K. DAVIS, TREATISE (2d ed.)]; The Casefora ProceduralDue ProcessLimitalions on the Zoning Referendum: City ofEastlake Revisited, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 51, 93 (1978);
Note, Adjudication by Labels, supra note 182, at 528; Note, The Proper Use of Referenda in
Zoning, 29 STAN. L. REv. 819, 831 (1977); Fordham Note, supra note 182, at 153 Developments-Zoning, supra note 127, at 1539-41 (majority did not rule on notice and hearing
question) with Montgomery Co. v. Woodward & Lothrop, inc., 280 Md. 686, 376 A.2d 483,
498 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1067 (1978); Comment, Referendum Zoning. State and
Federal Issues, supra note 182, at 917; Note, Zoning and Referendum: Converging Powers,
supra note 182, at 119 (majority held that referenda not subject to due process hearing requirement).
195. See Brief forAmrici Curiae: San Diego Building Contractors Associations, and Associated General Contractors of America, San Diego Chapter, Inc., at 8-17, City of Eastlake
v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
196. E.g., City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 204, 439 P.2d 290 (1968).
197. E.g., San Diego Bldg. Contr. Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570,
118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974), appeal dismissed, 427 U.S. 901 (1976); Allison v. Washington
County, 24 Or. App. 571, 548 P.2d 188 (1976).
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98
are not consulted on decisions which affect only a few citizens.'

Initiatives and referenda can be distinguished for due process purposes. California courts have held that, while initiatives impermissibly
deny notice and hearing, referenda in which voters are asked to ap-

prove ordinances first passed by the city council satisfy procedural requirements.1 99 There is some merit to this approach as interested
parties do receive notice and a public airing of issues prior to the referendum. Where policy issues are involved, a hearing before a city coun-

cil is perhaps the best means of informing voters about specific parcels
of land while satisfying individual landowners' entitlement to due process. The initiative process might also meet constitutional standards if
hybrid procedures were developed. For instance, a governing board

might be given the power, after an initiative is approved, to modify or
interpret a decision based on specific fact-finding. 2" Similarly, a hearing could be held and findings made with regard to purely factual is-

sues implicated in a complex referendum question.201

Such

alternatives deserve much closer analysis than can be provided here.

They illustrate the flexibility which a balancing test provides by giving
the legislature an opportunity to devise creative, thoughtful devices to
accommodate constitutional requirements.
D. Impartial Tribunal

Impartiality can be compromised in several ways. First, members
of a zoning authority can have a personal or pecuniary interest in a
matter. In adjudicative settings, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that even the slightest monetary interest violates due process; 20 2 in
cases of more attenuated personal interest, however, a decision maker
198. A similar balancing test is proposed in Comment, The Initiativeand Referendum's
Use in Zoning, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 74, 92-93 (1976).
199. Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 277 P. 308 (1929); Taschner v. City
Council, 31 Cal. App. 3d 48, 62 n.10, 107 Cal. Rptr. 214, 226 n.10 (1073).
200. This has been proposed by Justice Burke of the California Supreme Court. San
Diego Bldg. Contr. Ass'n City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 223-24 & n.7. 529 P.2d 570, 582 &
n.7, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146, 158 & n.7 (1976) (dissenting opinion).
201. This is not to say that the electoral process itself provides any sort of due process
hearing. Accord, id.at 221-22, 529 P.2d at 581, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 165 (Burke, J., dissenting).
For possible devices to inform citizens, see Hogue, Eastlake and Arlington Heights: New
Hurdles in RegulatingLand Use, 28 CASE W.L. REv. 42, 61 (1977); Note, Zoning and the
Referendum: ConvergingPowers, Conflicting Processes,6 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE,
97,127-32 (1977); Note, The Proper Use ofReferenda in Zoning, 29 STXN. L. REv. 819, 84849 (1977).
202. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35,47 & n.14 (1975); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564,
579 (1973); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 5 10
(1927).
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may retain his presumption of impartiality absent specific evidence 2of4
bias.20 3 Both of these principles have been applied in zoning cases. 0
Bias on issues, a second type of impartiality, presents a more sub-

tle problem. Though mere familiarity with the facts of a case will not
disqualify, 2 5 an official's demonstrated prejudgment of an issue has
been held violative of due process.20 6 A major problem in identifying
bias on issues, however, lies in the sometimes hazy distinction between

questions of fact and questions of policy. Professor Davis has emphasized differences between the two, 20 7 noting that where policy issues are

present, it is desirable from a "democratic accuracy" standpoint to have
decision makers biased toward certain policies-for which preferences
2 08
Of
they were presumably elected, or appointed by elected officials.
course, this implies that elected officials should be able to speak publicly and campaign on policy issues, though the issues may be implicated in pending zoning cases.20 9

The California Supreme Court took that position in City of Fairfield v. Superior Court.210 There, the court upheld a city council deci-

sion to deny a permit for a shopping center despite the fact that two
council members had publicly opposed it. The court based its conclu-

sion on the fact that the question was of great public interest and council members had a duty to discuss it publicly. In contrast, the
203. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).
204. Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971) (planning
commissioner's prior legal representation of party precluded the appearance of fairness required by due process); Armstrong v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 158 Conn. 158, 256 A.2d 799
(1969) (fact that zoning board member's son had attended school owned by a party did not
violate due process absent specific evidence of bias); Horn v. Township of Hilltown, 461 Pa.
745, 337 A.2d 858 (1975) (where the same attorney served as counsel to both the zoning
board and a local township, a party to the action, due process was deemed violated without a
specific showing of harm).
205. Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482, 493
(1976).
206. E.g., Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964), vacated andremandedon othergrounds,
381 U.S. 739 (1965) (both cases involved disqualification of a Federal Trade Commissioner
based on speeches he made concerning litigants).
207. 2 K. DAVIS, TREATISE, supra note 74, § 12.01.
208. See id at 137. See also Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. I v. Hortonville Educ.
Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482, 493-95 (1976) (holding that making public a position on a policy issue
does not violate due process).
209. Legislators have been immune from disqualification for bias. But under a legislative-adjudicative sliding scale for local legislative bodies, disqualification would be possible
in some cases. Here, the fact-policy dichotomy would be more significant than the number
of owners or size of the parcel at issue, because of the accuracy considerations mentioned in
the text. See text accompanying notes 68-77.
210. 14 Cal. 3d 768, 537 P.2d 375, 122 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1975).
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Washington Supreme Court in Chrobuck v. Snohomish County,21 '
found that a planning commissioner's public statements in support of
an oil refinery, made before he was appointed to the commission, precluded the "appearance of fairness" essential to due process. Undoubtedly, a delicate balancing is required here between democratic values
and the protection of property owners against the unconsidered preferences of the majority, as reflected by political pressures on decision
makers. This balancing is similar to the weighing of values that must
be made for direct voter participation in zoning referenda.212
A third type of bias might result from the combination of functions handled by a particular deciding body. It is quite common for a
governing board or a zoning commission to both approve a master plan
or ordinance and decide on amendments to or variances from that
plan. The constitutionality of such a combination of functions in the
zoning area has not yet been determined. The Supreme Court has held
that preliminary parole revocation hearings may not be conducted by
the supervising parole officer because of his personal involvement with
the parolee.213 The Court has also held a combination of investigative
and adjudicative functions constitutionally permissible, absent a specific showing of bias, in cases involving a medical licensing board 214
and a social security hearing examiner. 215 Additionally, it has upheld
the Federal Trade Commissioners' dual responsibilities for policy making and adjudication." 6 Again, parallels can be drawn to the dual
functions of zoning authorities. Generally, state courts have permitted
agencies to serve joint functions, though they have sometimes indicated
that they would undertake closer judicial scrutiny of the decisions of
these agencies.217 Since any bias by zoning agencies would usually
serve the laudable end of upholding master plans and ordinances, without normally prohibiting a fair hearing on zoning changes, such a combination of functions should be allowed absent specific proof of
resulting bias that precludes a fair hearing.
E. Findings, Reasons and Record
Much of the administrative law requiring agencies to state findings
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

78 Wash. 2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971).
See notes 196-99 and accompanying text supra.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
2 K. DAVIS, TREATISE, supra note 74, § 13.02.
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and the reasons for decisions has judicial origins.2 18 In these cases,
courts have required a statement of the basis of the decision in order to
allow adequate judicial review. Because of this wide application of the
law to require findings and reasons and also because administrative
statutes commonly impose a similar requirement, courts have rarely
needed to invoke the Constitution. Zoning cases are no exception to
this general rule.2 19

There is certainly nothing wrong where a judicially promulgated
doctrine adequately protects individuals against constitutional violations. However, inadequate findings and reasons are still a major prob-

lem in zoning.220 For example, judicial doctrines may mean little
where an agency has almost complete discretion and is accordingly
subject to narrow judicial review. Also, a federal court, which cannot
substantively review state agency action absent arbitrariness or other
constitutional violation, would have to rely on procedural due process
to require findings and reasons. Thus, for some situations, a constitutionally based rule is necessary.
In a few cases, the Supreme Court has based a requirement of
findings and reasons on the due process clause. 22' Due process values
are implicated in the need for findings, beyond their usefulness to a

reviewing court. According to Professor Robert Rabin,222 "A reasons
requirement would promote a heightened sense of accountability, an
added impulse to investigate thoroughly, and a tendency to clarify
analysis (and, in some cases, confront dubious motives).

223

Mandatory statements of reasons and findings also tend to promote
uniform decisions in similar cases, 224 again serving the values of accuracy and acceptability. The latter value is served simply because deci218. Id §§ 16.01, .04, .12.
219. 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 20.41 (2d ed. 1976); 8A E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.272 (3d ed. 1976); Comment, The Fasano
Procedures IsDue Process Enough?, 6 ENVT'L L. 139, 160 (1975). A good example of a
ruling based on common law necessity of adequate review is Donovan v. Clarke, 222 F.
Supp. 632 (D.D.C. 1963).
220. See Dukeminier & Stapleton, supra note 3, at 332; Shapiro, The Zoning Variance
Power-Constructivein Theory, Destructivein Practice,29 MD. L. REv. 3, 13 (1969).
221. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
222. Rabin, Job Security andDue Process.- MonitoringAdministrative Discretion Through
a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. CHI. L. REv.60 (1976).
223. Id at 78. See also Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing,123 U. PA.L. REV. 1267, 1292
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Friendly].
224. See Friendly, supra note 223, at 1292. See also Green v. Hayward, 275 Or. 693, 552
P.2d 815 (1976), where the court cites this purpose while holding that due process requires
findings ina zoning decision.

1052

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol.6:1011

sions are made more comprehensible to those adversely affected. 25
A requirement of findings in land use disputes has been developed
in several Oregon cases following the Fasano226 decision, which man-

dated that "adequate findings" be made in any adjudicative zoning decision. In South of Sunnyside Neighborhood League v. Board of
Commissioners,227 the county commissioners approved an amendment
of a comprehensive plan to allow a sixty-five acre parcel to be used as a
commercial district. The Oregon Supreme Court held that county
commissioners had insufficiently justified the amendment. The court
listed three elements required of a statement of findings and reasons:
(1) the facts relied on; (2) the relevant criteria for the decision, includ-

ing objectives and policies; and (3) a description of how the proposed
action will serve the relevant policies. In an Oregon Court of Appeal
case, West v. City ofAstoria,2 28 a planning commission provided inade-

quate findings when it granted a conditional use permit to allow a
youth center. The court stated that the commission should have ex-

plained how the proposed center came within the statutory criteria for
permits, why it conformed to the city's comprehensive plan, and how it
met lot size and other similar statutory requirements for the granting of
permits. Both these decisions provide intelligent delineations of what

the Consitution requires from zoning authorities.
Since Fasano, the Oregon courts have classified zoning decisions
as adjudicative whenever a few owners are involved, even though a
single decision, as in Sunnyside, may involve the rezoning of a sixty-

five acre parcel that would affect the entire community. This approach
225. Friendly, supranote 223, at 1292; Pincoffs, supra note 66, at 178-79; 8A E. McQUIL25.272 (3d ed. 1976).
226. Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 588, 507 P.2d 23, 30 (1973). The
North Carolina Supreme Court has also established a findings requirement for land use
hearings. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Board of Aldermen, 284 N.C. 458, 202 S.E.2d 129
(1974).
227. 280 Or. 3, 21-23, 569 P.2d 1063, 1076-77 (1977).
228. 18 Or. App. 212, 221-22, 524 P.2d 1216, 1220-21 (1974). See also Petersen v. Mayor
and Council of Klamath Falls, 279 Or. 249, 566 P.2d 1193 (1977) (findings and reasons
required for annexation decision); Bienz v. City of Dayton, 29 Or. App. 761, 566 P.2d 904
(1977) (adequate findings and reasons given for city council's approval of a subdivision);
Tierney v. Duris, 21 Or. App. 613, 536 P.2d 435 (1975) (adequate findings provided by commissioners in granting amendments to plan and ordinance although findings were adopted
after due process challenge was filed in court); Auckland v. Board of County Comm'rs, 21
Or. App. 596, 536 P.2d 444 (1975) (findings in zone overlay decision adequate where county
commission adopts planning commission's detailed statement); Dickinson v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 21 Or. App. 98, 533 P.2d 1395 (1975) (adequate findings provided by
commissioners in decision to deny amendments to plan and ordinance): Bergford v. Clackamas County, 15 Or. App. 362, 515 P.2d 1345 (1973) (county commissioners must state findings when enlarging a nonconforming use).
LIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §

Summer 1979]

ZONING DECISIONS

is similar to a legislative-adjudicative sliding scale. Under that theory,
it seems that deference should be given only to legislative decisions

which involve an entirely new plan or ordinance covering the entire
community. In those situations, it is nearly impossible for a body to
state all the reasons behind its decision, .though perhaps some sort of
legislative report might be required. Additionally, since policy ques-

tions are usually involved, individual legislators may have different
reasons for reaching the same result, making it impossible to produce a
succinct statement of the rationale for the decision. The absence of

factual questions and the presence of policy issues, however, do not
lessen the contribution of a reasons requirement to the goal of accurate,
acceptable decision making. These values are invoked equally in both
situations.2 29
The Fasano court also required that a record be made of every

adjudicative zoning decision.230 Although this is not a terribly onerous
administrative burden on a zoning authority, it seems that a detailed
statement of findings and reasons alone would satisfy due process and

therefore this additional safeguard is unnecessary. 3 ' Indeed, the Oregon Court of Appeal subsequently held that due process was satisfied

by the provision of minutes of a planning commission meeting which
included summaries of testimony given at a hearing. A verbatim record of the hearing was not required.232
F. Administrative Standards
The constitutional doctrine prohibiting standardless delegation of
legislative power 23 3 has been applied extensively in the zoning context.

Delegations have been struck down where power was given to voters2 34
either neighbors or all voters-in initiative or referenda procedures,
229. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 16.00 (1976) [hereinafter

cited as LAW OF THE SEVENTIES].
230. Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 588, 507 P.2d 23, 30 (1973).
231.

D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 224

(1975).
232. Bienz v. City of Dayton, 29 Or. App. 761, 782-85, 566 P.2d 904, 921-22 (1977).
Courts may deem a record necessary to enable adequate judicial review, but as noted above,
that is a common law consideration, not a constitutional requirement.
233. This doctrine was upheld by the Supreme Court in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
234. E.g., Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928);
Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912); City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, 103
Ariz. 204, 439 P.2d 290 (1968); Marta v. Sullivan, 248 A.2d 608 (Del. 1968). A referendum
by the entire citizenry was recently deemed a legal reservation of power in City of Eastlake
v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976). See text accompanying notes 182-201

supra.
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and to city legislative or administrative bodies.23 5 Though the cases do
not precisely state the constitutional authority, the doctrine seems to be
based upon article I, section 1 of the Constitution.23 6 That provision,
however, refers only to Congress and is therefore inapplicable to action
by the states.2 37 Eubank v. City of Richmond,2 38 Washington ex re. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge 3 9 and similar state court decisions have
relied on the due process clause in stating the nondelegation principle.
Today, the doctrine is virtually dead at the federal level 40 and slowly

dying in the state courts as well. 24 ' Zoning cases are no exception. 242 It

is unreasonable to expect state legislatures to provide detailed stan-

dards when delegating zoning power to cities and counties. Accordingly, the standardless delegation issue will not be discussed here.
However, the related problem of administrative standards is wor-

thy of analysis. Professor Davis has championed the idea that, given
the foreseeable demise of the nondelegation doctrine, administrative

discretion can be controlled by requiring agencies to set certain standards for their decision making.,2 43 He proposes that such a requirement be based on one or more of several constitutional and common
law grounds, including the due process clase. 244 Some federal courts of

appeal have relied on the due process clause in striking down state administrative decisions where no reasonably clear standards for decision
235. See 1 K. DAVIS, TREATISE, supra note 74, § 2.09; 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW
§§ 18.08, 19.09 (2d ed. 1976); 5 N. WILLIAMS, JR., AMERIC NN PLANNING LAW
§ 129.04 (1975) [hereinafter cited as N. WILLIAMS]; Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 1083 (1958).
236. U.S. CONST. art. I, § I provides that: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives." See 1 K. DAVIS, TREATISE (2d ed.), supra note 194, § 3:4; Annot., 58
A.L.R.2d 1083, § 2.
237. Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937); Freund, The Supreme
OF ZONING

Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REV. 533, 537 n.31 (1951).

238. 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
239. 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
240. See, e.g., National Cable Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 352-53 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting); I K. DAVIS, TREATISE (2d ed.), supra note 194, § 3:2.
But see City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 6(8 (1976), which by
negative implication would seem to affirm the continued validity of Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912), and Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278
U.S. 116 (1928). See also Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1976) (delegated standards found adequate).
241. See I K. DAVIS, TREATISE (2d ed.), supra note 194, § 3:14.
242. 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 18.08, 19.09 (2d ed. 1976); 5 N.
WILLIAMS, supra note 235, § 130.02; Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 1083, § 2.
243. 1 K. DAVIS, TREATISE (2d ed.), supra note 194, § 3.15; LAw OF THE SEVENTIES,
supra note 229, §§ 2.00-2.00-6; 1 K. DAVIS, TREATISE, 1970 Supplement, supra note 74,

§§ 2.00, 2.00-5.
244. LAW OF

THE SEVENTIES, supra note

229, 1977 Supplement § 2.00.
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making were provided by the legislature or the agencies. 245

Professor Davis' proposal is applicable to the zoning process. In
fact, a similar rule was established in some cases for municipal legislatures through the old nondelegation doctrine. These bodies wereconstitutionally bound to provide decision making standards when

delegating power to zoning commissioners or boards of appeal. This
requirement was extended to grants of power by state legislatures to
municipal legislatures and even to delegations by municipal legislatures to themselves. The result was peculiar cases like Osius v. City of

St. ClairShores,2 4 6 which held that a city council had failed in its legislative capacity to set sufficient standards for the delegation of permitgranting power to itself.

The articulation of standards is precisely what Davis' proposal
would require, but without the legal gymnastics. It mandates that any
decision making body- city council, zoning commission or board of
adjustment-set reasonably clear standards to guide its own decision

making. Those standards could still be set by the delegating body. It is
unlikely, however, that state legislatures can provide guidelines to each
town. It is much more feasible for town legislatures to provide standards to their own zoning appeals boards. Yet if a municipal council
does not legislate such standards, due process could still be met if the

zoning board itself set standards. These would presumably be overruled if unsatisfactory to the council.

A standards requirement would go far to prevent arbitrary decisions, and thus serve accuracy and acceptability values. Accuracy espe245. Eg., White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976) (distribution of state relief
monies); Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968); Hornsby v.
Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964) (liquor licensing); United States v. Atkins, 323 F.2d 733
(5th Cir. 1963) (voter registration). To be distinguished are cases like Soglin v. Kauffman,
418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969), which struck down a disciplinary sanction against a student by
a state university because the university failed to provide adequate definition of a rule penalizing "misconduct." The court held this rule unconstitutionally vague and against due process. In such cases the primary purpose of requiring adequate standards is to warn
individuals what conduct is prohibited or allowed, and only secondarily to guide individuals
in presenting their cases to agencies. In zoning adjudication, the latter purpose is more
important. Except in situations involving non-conforming uses, a property owner's prior
conduct is not judged; rather, a proposal is involved which the owner should be able to
carefully tailor to meet explicit zoning standards. Although a neighbor's position in a dispute is determined by the "conduct" of the neighborhood, neighbors are certainly not expected to alter their conduct in order to affect a decision. Nevertheless, they too should be
given notice of the standards for decision making so they can present their situation in the
best light.
246. 344 Mich. 693, 75 N.W.2d 25 (1956). See also Fondren v. Morgan City, 220 So.2d
136 (La. App. 1969) and cases cited therein. But see Zellinger v. CRC Dev. Corp., 281 Md.
614, 380 A.2d 1064 (1977).

1056

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 6:1011

cially would be fostered since requiring standards would make zoning
decisions more consistent and rational, which should in turn create the
most efficient, beneficial allocation of land.24 7 This approach has been
applied in a recent zoning case decided by the federal district court for
the Virgin Islands.2 4 8 In that case, the court held that while the legislature could properly leave to a zoning board the task of formulating
standards for the allocation of zoning permits, the board had violated
due process in failing to establish adequate guidelines:
The problems are . . . apparent when one's ability to get approval from a board. . . cannot be predicted because no hint is
ever given either prior to or after application as to when the
board will give such approval and when it will withhold it. The
problem is basically one inimical to ad hoc, standardless decisions. . .. [A]gency attempts to control any form of behavior
should be governed by standards for decision which are stated in
advance and given wide circulation. . . . For due process reasons, these standards should be publicly promulgated and written
precisely enough to give fair warning as to what the standards for
decision will be.2 49
Admittedly it will require delicate balancing for courts to determine just how precise the standards must be. Overly comprehensive
guidelines will stifle necessary flexibility. Although the issuance of special permits implies detailed standards,2 5 ° the allocation of variances
should retain its flexible, accommodative function 25 ' while still requiring more definite than a showing of "unnecessary hardship."
One bold step in the direction of administrative standards would
be to require that a rudimentary comprehensive plan be approved
before any land may be taken under the police power.2-52 Many states
247. The need for a legal doctrine mandating decision making standards is suggested in
Bross, Circling the Squares of Euclidean Zoning: Zoning Predestinationand PlanningFree
Will, 6 ENVT'L L. 97, 144 (1975); and Dukeminier & Stapleton, supra note 3, at 330-32.
248. Harnett v. Board of Zoning Subdiv. & Bldg. Appeals, 350 F. Supp. 1159 (D.V.I.
1972). Several other zoning cases have relied on the nondelegation doctrine in holding that
agencies must be subject to decision making standards, even if they are set by the agencies
themselves. E.g., Bergford v. Clackamas County, 15 Or. App. 362, 515 P.2d 1345 (1973).
249. Harnett v. Board of Zoning Subdiv. & Bldg. Appeals, 350 F. Supp. 1159, 1161
(D.V.I. 1972). The court cited the Holmes, Hornsky, and Atkins opinions, described in note
245 supra.
250. 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, § 19.09 (2d ed. 1976).
251. Id See also Note, Administrative Discretion in Zoning, 82 HARv. L. REv. 668
(1969).
252. Consideration of the overall merits of comprehensive planning is beyond the scope
of this article. The classic articles advocating use of the comprehensive plan are Haar, In
Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154 (11)55); and Haar, The
MasterPlan: An Impermanent Constitutiog 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 353 (1955) [hereinafter cited as The Master Plan]. A recent discussion is Mandelker, The Role of the Local
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statutorily require master plans, and some courts have begun to strictly
enforce that requirement.2 53 Absent such a statute, the Constitution
may still require a minimal amount of comprehensive planning. This
is because when compared with other governmental controls, zoning is
constitutionally unique, partly because the right to use and enjoy land
is so fundamental to our legal system and partly because the zoning
controls on the use of land involve extremely subtle considerations of
public welfare 54 Additionally, planning helps decision makers reach
the values behind the due process clause by contributing towards consistent, rational decisions.
Indeed, it could be argued that the Supreme Court's original approval of zoning as a valid exercise of the police power in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 255 was based on the existence of a reasoned
plan for dividing the community into different uses.2 56 Similarly, in
Udell v. Haas,2 5 7 the New York Court of Appeals recognized that planning is fundamental to the valid exercise of zoning. Although the Udell
court needed only to interpret the planning requirements of a single
town ordinance, the court spoke generally of the zoning process:
Zoning is not just an expansion of the common law of nuisance. It seeks to achieve much more than the removal of obnoxious gases and unsightly uses. Underlying the entire concept of
zoning is the assumption that zoning can be a vital tool for maintaining a civilized form of existence only if we employ the insights and the learning of the philosopher, the city planner, the
economist, the sociologist, the public health expert and all the
other professions concerned with urban problems.
This fundamental conception of zoning has been present
from its inception. The almost universal statutory requirement
that zoning conform to a "well-considered plan" or "comprehensive plan" is a reflection of that view. (See Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, U.S. Dept. of Commerce [1926].) The thought
behind the requirement is that consideration must be given to the
needs of the community as a whole. In exercising their zoning
powers, the local authorities must act for the benefit of the community as a whole following a calm and deliberate consideration
of the alternatives, and not because of the whims of either an
Comprehensive Plan in Land Use Regulation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 899 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Role of Local Plan].
253. E.g., Baker v. City of Milwaukee, 271 Or. 500, 533 P.2d 772 (1975).
254. See text accompanying notes 131-136 supra.
255. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
256. This position was taken by some parties in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976). See Brief for Respondent, at 18-19; Brief for Amici Curiae,
supra note 3,passim.
257. 21 N.Y.2d 463, 470-71, 235 N.E.2d 897, 901-02, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968).
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articulate minority or even majority of the community ...
[T]he comprehensive plan is the essence of zoning. Without it,
there can be no rational allocation of land use. It is the insurance
that the public welfare is being served and that zoning does not
become nothing more than just a Gallup poll.2" 8
Even a rudimentary plan has many functions and is thus a valuable requirement in any zoning scheme. It serves as a guide to the granting of special permits or variances excepting land from a general
ordinance. It should also guide the municipal legislature in passing
amendments to the ordinance. In this latter capacity, the plan has been
labelled an "impermanent constitution, ' 259 implying something more
lasting and important than a zoning ordinance. That is precisely what
any administrative standard under the Davis model must be: a guide
which, though formulated by the deciding body that uses it, transcends
that body's day-to-day decisions as a standing principle. A guide that
could be changed with each decision would be no standard at all.26 °
The planning model and administrative model merge here in their similar requirements of transcendent guidelines designed to impart rationality and uniformity to land use decision making.
G. Administrative Review
Due process requires only a single hearing. 26 ' Accordingly, where
a city council delegates to a zoning commission or board the power to
258. Id at 469, 235 N.E.2d at 900-01, 288 N.Y.S. 2d at 893-94.
259. The Master Plan, supra note 252.
260. Under the older, nondelegation model as expressed in Osius v. City of St. Clair
Shores, 344 Mich. 693, 75 N.W.2d 25 (1956), the plan takes the following role: The city
council, in its legislative capacity, approves a master plan (and zoning ordinance) which
become the standards accompanying the delegation of power to itself in its administrative
(and adjudicative) capacity to grant amendments or permits. This older conception could
guide courts in applying legislative-adjudicative considerations in a modem due process balance. A decision on a comprehensive plan or a widely applied zoning ordinance is a true
legislative decision and requires no standards. Amendment of the zoning ordinance is an
adjudicative decision which must be applied in accordance with minimum standards, perhaps articulated in the form of a master plan. The position of an amendment to a plan is
more ambiguous. (It is ambiguous-and undesirable-in the planning model as well.) See
'Role ofLocal Plan, supra note 252, at 946-51. If the plan is a minimal, rudimentary set of
guidelines, then any change is a legislative decision which requires few procedural safeguards and does not have to be made in accordance with supervening standards. On the
other hand, a detailed comprehensive land use plan might be based itself on a few general
principles which the legislature or zoning commission should follow in amending it. This
analysis implies an infinitely receding combination of true principles and inferred guidelines, but courts should attempt to avoid such a theoretical morass and simply try to strike a
balance of procedural fairness in a particular situation.
261. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 n.14 (1970).
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make recommendations which the council may approve or reject,2 62
due process requirements may be satisifed if the delegated authority
alone has a hearing and follows other procedures, and the council
merely approves its decision. 263 However, if the recommendations are
rejected, then due process considerations are again required. Although
the council may dispense with a hearing if a full record of the earlier
proceedings is available, it should submit findings and reasons for reversing the board and should be held to standards of impartiality. 264

Adherence to procedural safeguards by the council will also remedy
any lack of due process accorded by the recommending board. 265 Due

process should require review, with notice and hearing, of actions by
ministerial officers such as zoning administrators if there is a significant
question of fact involved.2 6 6 Review should always be available in

those jurisdictions where an administrator may grant a permit or variance at his discretion.26 7

V.

Conclusion

Zoning involves the employment of modem administrative and
262. This is a common practice. See 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING,
§§ 21.12-.13 (2d ed. 1976); 8 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,

22.225-.226 (3d ed. 1976).
263. Tierney v. Duris, 21 Or. App. 613, 536 P.2d 435 (1975); West v. City of Astoria, 18
Or. App. 212, 524 P.2d 1216 (1974). These Oregon decisions also require that the recommending body provide an "adequate record" and "adequate findings" to the city council,
but as long as the zoning power may be delegated anyway, the council should theoretically
be able to approve a recommendation in the most perfunctory manner without violating due
process. However, as noted in the text infra, it may not disapprovea recommendation without considering a full record, or holding a new hearing. Therefore, as a practical matter, the
council should require a full record from the board in all cases, in order to avoid the necessity of a second hearing.
264. City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1971). The court stated its
intention to avoid "this anomaly: Constitutionally guaranteed freedom from arbitrary action applies only to recommendations and not to accomplished fact in rezoning cases." Id
at 178.
265. F.P. Plaza, Inc. v. Waite, 230 Ga. 161, 196 S.E.2d 141, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 825
(1973). See also Armstrong v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 158 Conn. 158, 257 A.2d 799 (1969) (a
zoning commission acts in an "administrative capacity" and therefore its recommendations
to a quasi-judicial board of appeals need not be formulated through a full hearing); Gulf&
Eastern Dev. Corp. v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 354 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1978) (though a zoning
board decision must be reviewed by the city commission, the board must provide proper
notice of its hearing because its decision may have a temporary effect).
266. Review is commonly required by statute. See 8A E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.232 (3d ed. 1976). See also Goffinet v. County of Chris-

tian, 65 Ill. 2d 40, 54, 357 N.E.2d 442, 449 (1976) (due process provided where officer's
decision can be appealed to zoning board for a hearing).
267. This is rarely allowed. See 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, § 17.06

(2d ed. 1976).
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planning structures to regulate the most traditional of property rights,
the use of land. This article has explored how the constitutional due
process guarantee should be applied to prevent state administrative
agencies from unduly and unfairly impinging on property rights. The
complexity and variation among land use regulatory agencies makes
control by constitutional prohibition a difficult judicial task; however,
given the arbitrary decision making by many zoning bodies, courts
should rigorously enforce the due process clause.
In order to effectively guard all citizens' rights, courts should avoid
defining property interests in positivist terms, as that approach may exclude certain legitimate interests from due process protection. In determining what process is due those affected by zoning decisions, judges
should be guided by the goals of accuracy, acceptability and efficiency.
Finally, the legislative-adjudicative threshold test should be abolished
for decision making by local bodies and the considerations behind the
test incorporated into a more flexible process-due balancing. With
these refinements, courts could effectively use the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to insure fair procedures where state and
local authorities have failed to establish necessary safeguards.

